Pages

.

Fiction is Spinach

I've mentioned before, I read fiction grudgingly, much the way a young child eats cooked spinach grudgingly. 

The novel I've most recently
read and liked.
I've tried to figure out why this is—why, as a writer (mostly of nonfiction, but sometimes fiction), I find it so punishing to read novels. It wasn't always this way. When I was young, I was a page-flipping fool.

It comes down, I think, to just a couple of things.

First off, I'm impatient. I want immediate payback from anything in which I invest time these days, partly because I'm older now (and value my time differently than I did when I was 20), but also partly because of the Internet and how it has inexorably altered the value proposition of information interchange. In a single day, I find more answers to things via Google than I used to find in a month of spare-time noodling around. The Web gives the appearance (maybe not the reality) of instant gratification in all things knowledge-related, and this, I think, causes a subtle tectonic shift in one's Weltanschauung. My sense of normal information throughput has been recalibrated. It's hard to describe. Maybe I'll blog more about it later. When there's time.

The impatience problem isn't helped by the fact that, like many writers, I'm a slow reader. I read slowly because there's no other way to hear the words. I enjoy the sound of language, the syncopating rhythms, the chance alliterations, the assonance and dissonance. And I need time to gauge subtext. Nothing ruins a good read like speed-reading. I purposely read slowly, probably no more than 120 words a minute (although in short bursts I can go as slow as 25 wpm).

It also doesn't help that I'm an inveterate movie-watcher. Films these days are very tightly scripted. Usually something dramatic happens in the first five minutes, and sometime between the ten-minute mark and the twenty-minute mark, you have a solid understanding of who the main characters are, what their quests (their missions) are, and which direction(s) the plot will take them. Twenty minutes into a novel, I've read at most 10 pages. Most novels don't give you much to hold onto in 10 pages. Some do, of course. But not many. Not nearly enough.

Some novels (I'm thinking here of Dan Brown's work) make a conscious effort to move the story along in the first few pages, but often at the expense of good writing. So merely propelling me into the story isn't enough. I need to feel that what I'm reading has literary merit, a level of craft, a level of care with language, that's worth my time and thought.

It also has to be a compelling and unusual story. This gets to the crux of the matter, I think. Today's world is much richer, more dynamic, faster moving, and infinitely more perverse than the staid 1950s and early-1960s of my youth. Nonfiction books have become extraordinarily compelling over the years, while novels have receded into the bland landscape of cultural background noise. After you've been gripped by the profoundly perverse and terrifying goings-on in Naomi Klein's The Shock Doctrine or Robert Whitaker's Mad in America (two of the most remarkable nonfiction works I've ever encountered), you can't help but be convinced that truth is inherently stranger than fiction. Which of course puts fiction at a disadvantage.

Thus I wasn't at all impressed with Little Bee, one of the most acclaimed novels of recent memory, in which you're required to read 150 pages or so (I'm too lazy to check right now) to find out why the unhappily married white lady is missing a finger. Once I got to the big "finger reveal," I stopped reading; I found I wasn't really all that interested in the main characters and their various dysfunctions and affections and affectations. In fact, I felt cheated that the entire book pivoted on such a lame "dramatic turn" (the chopping off of the finger) and that it had been kept hidden for so long. Suddenly the intertwining plights of the poor black girl and the rich fingerless white lady seemed intolerably banal. I threw the book across the room.

So, what do I like? Which novels could I stand to read anew?

I like The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, certainly. And Moby Dick. As for twentieth-century English novels, I'm partial to Catch-22 (a book I enjoyed from the very first page), as well as Flowers for Algernon by Daniel Keyes. I found Naked Lunch disappointing but was greatly impressed by Burroughs's Junky (the novel I've most recently read and liked). Junky is billed as fiction but is clearly more memoir than novel. As I look at the various novels I've enjoyed, they tend to be written in first-person and have a memoir-like aspect. They also tend to be tales written in such a way that you know from the very first page that you're in the hands of a masterful storyteller. Twain, Poe, Melville, Vonnegut, all tend to be that way. Joseph Heller hits the target with Catch-22 yet misses the mark in nearly everything else he wrote. (Burroughs is likewise infuriatingly uneven.)

I'm currently forcing myself to read On the Road, and once I finish (if I finish), I'll do a full review here. I'm halfway into the 2007 "Original Scroll" version (Penguin Classics), which is a direct transcription of Kerouac's famous 120-foot-long manuscript (typed single-spaced on a single roll of teletype paper). I came close to abandoning the book after 120 pages. But then the group arrives at Bill Burroughs's place in Louisiana and the quality of the writing takes a subtle shift.

It seems the proper answer to my dilemma (the way to get myself to enjoy fiction once again) is probably to unplug from the Internet, slow down the pace of life, relax, be more willing to lavish spare time on Other People's Ink, pry my brain loose from the trappings of cinema and cable news and cell phones and Twitter and the nonstop parade of cacophonous bullshit that constitutes life in the twenty-first century.

We all know that's not going to happen. The fact that it should happen, but can't, is the great tragedy of modern technological life. We're stuck in the miasma. Immobilized in digital riches too rich to measure. It's a miracle we can think at all.
reade more... Résuméabuiyad

The Science of Hippie-Punching


Hi, I'm Josiah Neeley. You might remember me from such blog posts as The Libertarian and the Union Organizer Can Be Friends (Maybe) and Corporate Personhood: Why It's Awesome. But today I would like to talk to you about an important issue facing our nation: hippie-punching.*

For those not in the know, "hippie-punching" refers to when someone (usually but not always on the center-left) attacks someone farther to their left as a means of gaining credibility and support with the general populace. The term appears to date from 2007, but the practice itself is far older. Bill Clinton, for example, was an expert hippie-puncher, and the term itself seems to be an oblique reference to the 1968 Democratic convention, when anti-war protesters battled Chicago police under the control of Democratic mayor Richard Daley (the nearest right-wing equivalent to the term "hippie-punching" is "that time when William F. Buckley kicked the Birchers out of the conservative movement").

Hippie-punching is generally used in a derogatory manner, implicitly suggesting that punching hippies is somehow a bad thing. Yet scientific research suggests that hippie-punching may in fact play a positive role in our political process.

For example, last year Chris Mooney looked at the so-called "radical flank effect" whereby the existence of individuals and groups pushing for radical action on an issue makes people more willing to deal with moderates on the issue. For the flanking effect to be positive, however, it is necessary that moderates and radicals not get lumped together in public perceptions. If that happens, the radical flank effect can turn negative, inspiring a backlash and tainting even moderate action on an issue with the actions of the radical fringe:
one of the critical factors in determining whether a radical flank effect will be positive or negative is the way moderates and activists relate to one another. “How clearly are the moderates and radicals differentiating themselves?” asks Carleton College’s Devashree Gupta. This, as Gupta notes, shapes media coverage and the thinking of politicians and policymakers who may be calculating whether helping the moderates will ease the headaches the radicals create for them.
One way for moderates to differentiate themselves from radicals is to engage in a little hippie-punching now and again. And while it may not feel that way to those on the receiving end on such attacks, they are actually providing a valuable service by helping empower moderates to moving policy in their preferred direction:
The sad irony here is that the activists don’t get what they want. In the end, they merely get to help out the moderates. But that’s the nature of the positive radical flank effect.


*All references to violence in this post are purely metaphorical. No hippies were harmed during the production of this blog post. 
reade more... Résuméabuiyad

A Year of No Alcohol

Today marks a full year since I gave up alcohol. And I'm glad I gave it up, because the risk/reward ratio had long since deteriorated far past the point of being able to justify the continued, never-ending expense, not only in terms of pocket money but in terms of mental and physical health. It's like when you continue to own that clapped-out school-graduation car beyond the point where it needs brakes and belts, beyond the point of needing shocks and a muffler and new rear speakers and a little body work, and—wait a minute, why is the heat not coming on now?

I was getting so little benefit from alcohol compared to the down side. No amount of beer gave me that elusive hey-howya-doin' social effusiveness, that tickly-giddy reach-up-and-touch-the-moon buzz I once got, way back—when, exactly? High school? College? Heck, I hadn't gotten a decent high from beer (or any other alcoholic beverage) in decades. Intoxication? Sure. Numbness? Lots. Clumsiness? Puffy nose? Eye-baggage? A beer belly? I got a lot of things from beer. But a buzz worth talking about? I can't remember when that last happened.

Let me tell you what I do remember.

I remember the many mornings waking up sideways on the bed two hours late, fully dressed in yesterday's clothes, not recollecting having gone to bed.

I remember the beer cans, everywhere: In the recycling bin. On the floor. Atop the fridge. In (and next to) the kitchen garbage. On the water closet. The back porch. The kitchen sink. My desk.

I remember the panicky midnight trips to the local mini-mart to replenish my stock of Bud Ice (which I had been sure, just two hours before, I had a plenty-big supply of, on hand). Always hoping I wouldn't get pulled over. (Yet always sure I could walk a better line, drunk, than the average person could, sober.)

I remember the time I staggered into the back bedroom at one in the morning looking for a paper clip, I think it was
—and somehow I ended up on my back, on the carpet, with an office chair on my face, the plastic arm of the chair having neatly scraped away a half-inch-wide swath of epidermis from my forehead. It was just a surface wound, but there was a ridiculous amount of blood from it. I laughed at the preposterousness of the whole scene. Then I explained it away as a "freak accident."

I could go on and on. But I won't. Mind you, I had originaly planned a much longer post today on this subject, and I got about halfway through the writing of it before I found myself bored to tears. I have a firm rule, which is I never write anything that bores me. So I may (or may not) return to that piece later, when and if I think of something suitably upbeat to say about the whole thirty-years-of-beer-guzzling thing. Except, there's nothing fun or glamorous or upbeat or profound about it. I drank anywhere from two to twelve beers a day (less in the beginning; more as the years wore on) for almost forty years. The first ten years or so were sweet. The second ten were tolerable. The last twenty were stupid, and embarrassing, and (overall) hellishly unsatisfying.

I can honestly say I don't miss alcohol. I'm one of the lucky ones: I never had withdrawal symptoms. I didn't have, and still don't have, cravings. I can go out to eat and enjoy a non-alcoholic Beck's with dinner and not wish it were the real thing. I can be at a party and see other people happily trading sips of  this or that merlot or shiraz and not give a rat's rectum. Alcohol is for other people now. It no longer interests me.

When I see people making jokes involving alcohol on Twitter, I smile wistfully and nod, thinking "Yeah, I remember when it was like that." It was fun for a while. Especially in the beginning. First high best high.

It's fun until it isn't. And then it's time to just move on.



reade more... Résuméabuiyad

The Bacterium Behind Colon Cancer

Today I wrote a post for BigThink that I've been meaning to write for weeks. In August, several papers were published showing that a particular bacterium, Fusobacterium nucleatum, is strongly implicated in development of colorectal cancer (CRC).

Fusobacterium living in intestinal mucosa.
The latest research in no way invalidates the huge existing body of work showing strong (almost certainly causal) connections between CRC and consumption of alcohol, sugar, meat, and/or tobacco. There are other risk factors as well, such as lack of physical activity (by itself), obesity,  and genetics. (See this paper and this one for more discussion, and by all means do further investigation on your own using Google Scholar.) Genetic susceptibility, however, plays a role in no more than about 5% of CRC cases. (And even in those cases, it's by no means certain that bad alleles constitute a death sentence.)

The picture that's emerging is a complex one in which intestinal dysbiosis triggered by (for example) poor eating habits leads to the differential accumulation of various species of gut bacteria (Bacteroides fragilis, Fusobacterium nucleatum, and others) that are implicated in colorectal cancer. At some point (over a period of years, apparently), Fusobacterium gains entry to intestinal muscosal cells. (F. nucleatum has aspects of an intracellular-parasitic lifestyle.) Once it has established residency, F. nucleatum overproduces FadA adhesin, a small protein containing 129 amino acids, the exact sequence for which (in FASTA format) is:

>tr|Q5I6B0|Q5I6B0_FUSNU Adhesion A OS=Fusobacterium nucleatum GN=fadA PE=1 SV=1
MKKFLLLAVLAVSASAFAATDAASLVGELQALDAEYQNLANQEEARFNEERAQADAARQA
LAQNEQVYNELSQRAQRLQAEANTRFYKSQYQELASKYEDALKKLEAEMEQQKAVISDFE
KIQALRAGN

The letters here correspond to amino acids, using the standard one-letter code system (as presented here). In three dimensions, the FadA protein looks something like this:

Your new worst enemy: FadA adhesin produced by Fusobacterium nucleatum, the "kickoff protein" for colon cancer.

When this relatively small protein binds with normal E-adhesin (in a specific 11-amino-acid region), it activates β-catenin signaling, which in turn unleashes a cascade of cytokines (cytokines IL-6, IL-10, IL-12, IL-17, plus TNF-α) and an inflammatory cycle that leads straight to adenoma of the colon.

For the non-paywalled research paper on this, go to http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0053653. Read that paper (and this one, if you can) and decide for yourself how strong the case is for F. nucleatum FadA as a causative agent in colorectal cancer. I think it's pretty clear. We're looking at a smoking gun.

Now the really interesting thing about F nucleatum is that it's most commonly found not in the large intestine but in your mouth. Which brings up some interesting questions, right? For example: How does poor oral hygiene correlate with colorectal cancer? Little work has been done on that specific connection, but a huge amount of work has been (and continues to be) done on the substantial and increasingly obvious link between periodontal disease and cancer in general (which I'll probably blog about at some future time).

If the link between F. nucleatum's FadA protein and CRC proves to be as solid as it's starting to look, it opens countless doors to new therapeutic approaches to CRC treatment and prevention. We need to know, for example, if specific probiotic treatments can greatly reduce the risk of precancerous adenomas by staving off dysbiosis. We also urgently need to know if the outlook for early-stage CRC patients can be improved with aggressive use of antibiotics, including antibiotic-induced near-sterilization of the large intestine followed by fecal transplantation to restore the normal flora.

It hardly needs mentioning, but if it turns out to be true that CRC is mainly a result of a single bacterium, perhaps a vaccine can be developed, either against Fusobacterium or against the FadA protein, or both.

I'm extremely encouraged by the recent research pinpointing FadA as the likely culprit in CRC. Obviously, much work remains to be done. But we have an exciting new insight into this particular type of carcinogenesis. The treatment options that come out of it may well lead to other cures.

Some of us (here I'm speaking with my microbiologist's hat on; I have an advanced degree in the subject) have long suspected that microbes play a role in fostering—and preventing—various cancers. When I was in graduate school, you could count the number of microbially caused neoplasms on your thumbs. Now you have to use most fingers of both hands. Who knows what the full truth may yet turn out to be?

Exciting times.

If you enjoyed this post, or the corresponding one at BigThink, do me a favor. Tweet it or share it in some fashion. This is knowledge that deserves to get out. Who knows? It may save a life.
reade more... Résuméabuiyad

Financing the Federal Government with Inflation-Protected Securities


In 1997, the U.S. Treasury made the contentious decision to begin issuing Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS). Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin proposed the issuance of these inflation-linked securities as a way to reduce the government's borrowing costs and increase the national saving rate, remarking:
"Helping the economy and raising incomes requires increasing productivity, and the saving rate is central to that objective. The initiative we are announcing today has the potential of raising our national saving rate as well as reducing the cost of capital to the federal government. Today we are announcing our intention to issue securities that will offer investors protection against inflation. Americans' retirement savings in their pension plans or their own IRAs can have inflation protection, which can help ensure their retirement security... 
We believe these bonds will offer savers value-added in the form of protection against inflation, plus a real rate of return backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, and in return for offering that value-added, over time the cost of financing to the federal government will be lower than it otherwise would be...This is a common sense approach to government and an excellent example of government reinvention -- protecting Americans from inflation with an innovative investment method, and saving them money as taxpayers by holding down borrowing costs."
In July 2008, however, advisers to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson recommended that Paulson should eliminate five-year TIPS and reduce the use of TIPS of other maturities, arguing that the inflation-indexed securities had cost taxpayers billions. This advice was not put into effect. The question remains: Has the Treasury benefited from issuing TIPS? I explore the mixed evidence in this post, the second in my series about inflation-indexed debt. The first post in the series, "Academic Scribblers and the History of Inflation-Protected Securities," describes  the origins and re-origins of inflation-linked government debt, which briefly appeared in 1780 and then disappeared for two centuries.

First, why might we expect TIPS to hold down borrowing costs in theory? Nominal bonds expose investors to inflation risk, so their yields presumably contain an inflation risk premium; by issuing indexed bonds, the Treasury can avoid paying the premium. John Campbell and Robert Shiller pointed out in 1996 that the magnitude--and even the sign--of the inflation risk premium was unknown. How could the inflation risk premium possibly be negative? According to the classic text on asset pricing by John Cochrane,
"All assets have an expected return equal to the risk-free rate, plus a risk adjustment. Assets whose returns covary positively with consumption make consumption more volatile, and so must promise higher expected returns to induce investors to hold them. Conversely, assets that covary negatively with consumption, such as insurance, can offer expected rates of return that are lower than the risk-free rate...You might think that as asset with a volatile payoff is `risky' and thus should have a large risk correction. However, if the payoff is uncorrelated with the discount factor m, the asset receives no risk correction to its price, and pays an expected return equal to the risk-free rate!"
In short, the inflation risk premium does not depend directly on how uncertain or volatile inflation is. What matters for the inflation risk premium is how future inflation covaries with future consumption (alternatively, with the stock market), and that is not obvious. In 1996, Campbell and Shiller estimated the premium by several different methods and came up with an estimate of 50 to 100 basis points for a five-year zero-coupon nominal bond: in short, non-trivial savings for the government. These anticipated savings were part of the reason why the Treasury began issuing TIPS.

Why then, in 2008, did the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee recommend that TIPS should play a smaller role in meeting future financing needs? A member of the committee "estimates that the cumulative cost of the TIPs program to the Treasury since inception, when comparing the total expense relative to nominal bonds issued at a similar time, approaches $30 billion with the bulk of that cost a direct result of significantly higher inflation than estimated by the markets 'breakeven' level when issued." They attribute part of the cost to a liquidity cost, since TIPS are less liquid than nominals so investors must be compensated for the lower liquidity. They point out that the first factor--higher realized inflation than breakeven inflation--needn't necessarily continue. I would also point out that TIPS could gain liquidity over time as the TIPS market develops further, but the Committee's recommendation would very likely have reduced TIPS' liquidity.

An academic study in 2010 supports the view of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee. In "Why Does the Treasury Issue Tips? The Tips–Treasury Bond Puzzle,"  Matthias Fleckenstein, Francis Longstaff, and Hanno Lustig estimate that "On average, the U.S. government has to levy $2.92 more in taxes, in present discounted value, to repay $100 of debt issued if the debt is indexed rather than nominal." They add that, in issuing TIPS, the government gives up a valuable fiscal hedging option. Fleckenstein et al. say that "To the best of our knowledge, the relative mispricing of TIPS and Treasury bonds represents the largest arbitrage ever documented in the financial economics literature."

Jens Christensen and James Gillan (2011), in contrast, say that the Treasury has benefited overall from using TIPS. There are two main premiums to consider: the inflation uncertainty premium and the liquidity premium. The former can help the government lower its borrowing costs by using TIPS, and while the latter can raise its borrowing costs. Both premiums can vary over time. Christensen and Gillan attempt to quantify the size of each premium and construct a liquidity-adjusted inflation risk premium. They come up with a range of estimates, and the most conservative is plotted below. The fact that it is, on average, positive (and less conservative estimates more obviously positive) supports Treasury's continued use of TIPS. I find their results fairly convincing, particularly in light of another study
Source: Christensen and Gillan (2011)
Another study, by William C. Dudley, Jennifer Roush, and Michelle Steinberg Ezer (2009) also comes out in support of TIPS as a cost-effective form of government financing. Their estimates of the inflation risk premium by maturity of issue are in the table below. They find that the liquidity compensation was around 200 basis points in 1999 but has since fallen drastically to well below 50 basis points. The positive risk premium and low liquidity compensation in combination imply cost savings for the Treasury.
Source: Dudley, Roush, and Steinberg Ezer (2009)
In my interpretation, the balance of evidence supports the idea that TIPS are mildly cost-effective, or at least not cost-increasing, for the Treasury. The government's borrowing cost is not the only factor to consider when evaluating the net effect of TIPS. Rubin, remember, suggested that TIPS would increase the nation's saving rate and in turn increase productivity. John Campbell and Robert Shiller listed other potential upsides and downsides to TIPS in their 1996 "A Scorecard for Indexed Government Debt." I'll discuss some of these other issues in future posts.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 1 of series: Academic Scribblers and the History of Inflation-Protected Securities

**Disclaimer: This post not intended as investment advice.
reade more... Résuméabuiyad

Are Humans Rational Utility Maximisers?


Paul Krugman's recent post on Wynne Godley involves a discussion that Yichuan Wang touched on this week — the widely-used assumption that people are rational utility maximisers. Krugman notes that the alternative approach — the sectoral rules of thumb approach embraced by Wynne Godley and many other post-Keynesians — was abandoned by mainstream macroeconomists in favour of other approaches:
So why did hydraulic macro get driven out? Partly because economists like to think of agents as maximizers — it’s at the core of what we’re supposed to know — so that other things equal, an analysis in terms of rational behavior always trumps rules of thumb. But there were also some notable predictive failures of hydraulic macro, failures that it seemed could have been avoided by thinking more in maximizing terms. 
First involved consumption spending. Conventional Keynesian consumption functions suggested that the savings rate would rise as incomes rose — and this wasn’t just the Keynesian interpreters, Keynes himself made the same claim. This, in turn, led to predictions of rising savings rates after World War II, and hence a persistent shortage of demand — hence the secular stagnation theory briefly prominent. (There was even an early Heinlein novel built in part around the secular stagnation theory. As I recall, it was pretty bad.)

In fact, however, savings rates don’t seem to follow the naive consumption function at all; they rise in booms, and are higher for the wealthy, but exhibit no secular trend. And Milton Friedman appeared to explain this paradox by arguing that people are more less rational: they base consumption on “permanent income”, a reasonable estimate of long-run income, and save temporary fluctuations in income.

The second big problem involved inflation. We can argue how many economists really believed in a stable tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, but that’s certainly what got taught to many students. In came Friedman and Phelps to argue that rational price-setters would build expected inflation into their choices, so that sustained low unemployment would produce accelerating inflation. And the stagflation of the 70s seemed to vindicate their argument.

You could argue, and I would, that the rebellion against hydraulic macro went much too far. It’s not at all clear how much good the whole apparatus of maximizing behavior in New Keynesian models really does, and to the extent that such models do seem more or less to work, it’s only by making some ad hoc behavioral assumptions that are grafted on to the rest of the structure. 
Krugman's points regarding the specific approaches of post-Keynesians of the day are reasonable. There emerged empirical observations that their models did not explain, that could be explained by alternative theories. On the other hand, that doesn't necessarily say anything about a rule of thumb or a sectoral approach to macroeconomics. Many approaches can be used to create a model consistent with data, and similar methodological approaches can lead to wildly divergent models with wildly divergent predictions through varying assumptions.

Post-Keynesian ideas — and those of other heterodox schools that made noise about the possibility of the crisis in the early and mid 2000s — have regained a certain amount of public spotlight in recent years, (and in some cases, almost immediately lost the spotlight by making subsequent bad predictions). On the other hand, they do not appear to have gained much academic credibility, perhaps because claims to have "predicted the crisis" are not as convincing to an academic audience as they are to a general one.

The key difference between post-Keynesian sectoral theories, and neoclassical micro-founded ones is in their assumptions. Post-Keynesians using Godley-style models make behavioural assumptions about group behaviours in different sectors; workers, the financial sector, etc. Neoclassical theories make assumptions about individual behaviour — individual utility maximisation, rational preferences and action based on full and relevant information. In both cases, these are all simple heuristics and should probably not really be taken seriously as an attempt to model reality in a literal sense; we should as Milton Friedman famously noted be concerned most by a theory's predictive power. On the other hand, it does not seem desirable to start off with a framework that is obviously wrong. That is, a good theory should have predictive power at both ends — it should start with an accurate (-ish) depiction of reality, and end with successful predictions of reality.

It is arguable that the notion of utility maximisation falls into the category of obvious wrongness. Krugman's conclusion that "It’s not at all clear how much good the whole apparatus of maximizing behavior in New Keynesian models really does" suggests that he may be cautiously leaning in that direction too.  There are two reasons for this — evidence from behavioural economic experiments, and results from neurophysiology. 

One of the most famous tests of Paul Samuelson's definition of utility maximisation (completeness, transitivity, non-satiation, convexity) was undertaken by Reinhard Sippel in 1997. He gave his student test subjects a budget, and a set of eight priced commodities to spend their budget on:
UtilityMaximisation


This was repeated ten times, with ten different budget and price combinations. Sippel found that 11 out of 12 of his test subjects’ behaviour failed to meet Samuelson’s criteria for rational utility maximisation. Sippel repeated the experiment later with thirty test subjects, finding that 22 out of 30 did not meet Samuelson’s criteria. Sippel concluded:
We conclude that the evidence for the utility maximisation hypothesis is at best mixed. While there are subjects who appear to be optimising, the majority of them do not.
The evidence emerging in neurophysiology against utility maximisation is more damning. As Daniel McFadden summaried this year in The Atlantic:
Our brains seem to operate like committees, assigning some tasks to the limbic system, others to the frontal system. The “switchboard” does not seem to achieve complete, consistent communication between different parts of the brain. Pleasure and pain are experienced in the limbic system, but not on one fixed “utility” or “self-interest” scale. Pleasure and pain have distinct neural pathways, and these pathways adapt quickly to homeostasis, with sensation coming from changes rather than levels. Overall, presumably as a product of evolution, our brains are organized well enough to keep us alive, fed, reproducing, and responsive to but not overwhelmed by sensation, but they are not hedonometers.
None of this, of course, should be treated as a conclusive blow for any other extant modelling approach or set of assumptions. One reason why neoclassical economics has remained dominant in academia is that other heterodox schools have not yet convincingly envisaged anything conclusively superior Yet, I think, it should be treated as a conclusive blow for the idea that a lot more work is required in coming to a better understanding of the patterns and systems underpinning human economic behaviour. And I think the answers will emerge not from theory but from experimental economics and psychology on the interpersonal level, and from neurology and neurophysiology on the individual level.

This is something that Krugman (and all wannabe Hari Seldons) may eventually be able to get very, very excited about. The only road, I think, to anything approaching psychohistory is mechanically understanding the underlying drives and dynamics of human behaviour, rather than making crude black box assumptions and hoping for the best. 
reade more... Résuméabuiyad

A Syria Recap

Somebody, probably Syrian army regulars, maybe with a go-ahead from the highest levels of government (maybe not), killed 1400 people in Damascus using sarin gas.

International community: "Terrible. Just awful. A shame." (Then back to business as usual.)

United States: "How dare you! How dare you kill 1400 people with chemicals, when you could have killed them with bullets, the acceptable way! We are of course happy to stand by and watch you slaughter each other by the tens of thousands with bullets and mortars and cutlery. But bug spray? This is an outrage. You must now be punished, severely, with beautiful American-crafted $1.4 million cruise missiles by Raytheon, which will reduce your artillery, your planes, and your chemical slingshots to rubble. Of course, we will not actually destroy your chemical weapons, because that would only unleash obnoxious fumes and kill more people the Unacceptable Way. American Exceptionalism demands that we show you the proper, Acceptable Way of killing people. And we will do it soon, with our very large and suitably phallus-like missiles. We don't care how many women and children you place in our missiles' paths or the fact that even if they land in the desert and kill no one, you'll still show the world photographs of dead civilians 'killed by U.S. missiles,' thereby destroying whatever subatomic particle of credibility we continue to have on the world stage. This may be a lose-lose situation for us, but it is a lose-lose-LOSE-lose-lose-LOSE situation for those who dare to kill people with chemical fumes, even if many tons of ingredients used in the making of your chemical weapons came from our good friends in the UK."

CIA: "And by the way, here are a few truckloads of guns and stuff you were asking for. Don't let them fall into the wrong hands. You know, people who might be hostile to the U.S.? You don't know anybody like that, do you?"

Bashar al-Assad: "I shall not dignify any of this with a response. Instead I shall affix my signature to a piece of your treaty-paper, and take my case directly to Charlie Rose."

Kerry: "Damn, the UK just caved in to the will of the people! What the actual fuck was that about? And it looks like we have some haters in the House who are going to obstruct us on this."

Lavrov: "Perhaps you have heard of a TV show, it was once popular in your country? Let's Make a Deel."

Obama (crouching in a corner, tentatively touching a finger to the floor, then to each wall, then the floor again): "Man, I thought this stuff would never dry. And the fumes are killing me."

Putin: "Stay thirsty, my friends."
reade more... Résuméabuiyad