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What Kurzweil Is Forgetting

In the Twilight Zone episode "The Lonely,"
Jean Marsh plays the robotic companion of
Jack Warden (who is stranded on an asteroid).
Ray Kurzweil has written a stimulating essay for Discover titled "How Infinite in Faculty," in which (surprise, surprise) he predicts that by 2029, it will be possible to create a machine that shows every evidence of being "conscious." The full text of the piece is online here.

According to Kurzweil, such machines will "exhibit the full range of familiar emotional cues; they will make us laugh and cry" [note: my Windows Vista laptop already makes me cry] "and they will get mad at us if we say we don't believe they are conscious."

I don't know if Kurzweil wrote the teaser line just under the headline of the article ("Future machines will exhibit a full range of human traits and help answer one of science's most important questions: What is consciousness?"), but it seems likely he had final veto power over the article's final presentation, so I presume Kurzweil stands by the "full range of human traits" bit.

I think Kurzweil has conveniently overlooked a lot of what we know about humans and their "full range" of traits.

Human beings don't suddenly wake up as adults, with complex emotions, personality, and learned behaviors. The kind of machine Kurzweil is talking about doesn't start out as an infant and go through the complex parental and social interactions (and stages of neurolgical development) that a very young human goes through. Therefore the machine would not magically exhibit human adult traits straight out of the box. A human's emotional self is the outcome of years of development (involving responses to things like sibling rivalry, learned gender-based behaviors, the side-effects of parental divorce, bullying in school, physical or psychological abuse by relatives, miscellaneous traumas and triumphs big and small, the ebb and flow of self-esteem issues throughout early life into young adulthood, all the messy hormone-influenced issues attendant to puberty, and so on).

Any sociologist will tell you that much of "who we are" is determined by the socially constructed norms of the society we live in. Thoughts and behaviors based on social norms aren't "data" that you can feed into a machine. It takes years of development, starting in infancy, to learn socially constructed concepts and integrate them into one's nervous system in a way that accords with (and simultaneously produces) an individual's personality traits around sex and gender, guilt, responsibility, ethics and morals, one's sense of "justice," self esteem, political philosophy, etc. (That's an absurdly short list of socially constructed phenomena, by the way.) These things don't spring up fully formed in an individual in a vacuum, the way they would have to in a "fully conscious" and emotionally complex Kurzweil machine.

For a machine to be Homo-complete (as in Homo sapiens), meaning that its responses to verbal and other stimuli are indistinguishable from those of a human being, the machine would have to be capable of starting "life" as a child and experiencing the developmental processes that allow a child to become an adult. (I don't subscribe to the idea that the complete neural state of an adult can simply be captured digitally and loaded into a machine to yield a Homo-complete pseudo-being. Nothing even close to that is going to be possible by 2029.) The machine would need to be capable (in theory, at least) of "growing up" to be male or female, if for no other reason than that the male and female human brains are anatomically and functionally different. Which gender will Kurzweil choose to replicate?

The machine would also have to be capable of developing psychological disorders, including PTSD if subjected to trauma, depression and other mood disorders (assuming the machine is capable of having moods, which Kurzweil certainly seems to be assuming), phobias and related severe anxiety, addiction behaviors, delusions, paranoia, mania, borderline personality disorder, OCD, cognitive issues, dissociative disorders, factitious disorders, and a range of other disorders (basically everything in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual), possibly including schizophrenia.

Any Homo-complete machine would also have to admit the possibility of sociopathic tendencies. (Many science fiction movies already portray cybernetic humans as homicidal, so perhaps this is a given.)

Kurzweil might argue "We wouldn't deliberately build in any pathologies of any sort." Yes, but many psychological disorders (and quite a few criminal behaviors) are emergent in nature. People aren't born with them. Neither will Kurzweil's machines be born with them.

Of course, a Kurzweil machine will have to be capable of sight, hearing, and touch, lest it be "born" into a nightmarish Helen Keller world. Yet merely "waking up with vision" is not a straightforward thing, neurologically. It takes infants many months to learn how to "see properly." People who suddenly recover from blindness as adults usually experience severe visual agnosia, and ultimately depression. [See this article.]

Bottom line, it's not clear to me how a Kurzweil machine can be truly Homo-complete in any meaningful sense. All it will be is a pseudo-conscious logic machine with, at best, inappropriate emotions based on retarded social development, and at worst, disturbing sociopathic tendencies. The prospects of such a machine being a worthy companion along the lines of the robot in the Twilight Zone episode The Lonely are slim to none.

In tomorrow's post, I'll get more specific about why Kurzweil's 2029 prediction is wrong.

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How much value does the finance industry create?



That is the question asked by John Cochrane in this recent draft essay (non-PDF version here), in response to a recent Journal of Economic Perspectives article by Robin Greenwood and David Scharfstein. Both should be required reading for any introductory finance class. There is so much in these essays that one blog post couldn't hope to adequately cover the topic, so don't expect this to be anything resembling a complete response.

Everyone knows that the finance industry has grown in America. In 1980, finance took home about 5% of all the income in America; in 2007, about 8%. This has led many people to question whether all this activity is worth what we pay for it; in other words, how much of the increase in finance-industry GDP is actually value added, and how much is "rent" extracted from the rest of the economy?

Cochrane makes the excellent point that the question of "How much value does industry X really create?" is always an incredibly difficult question to answer:
I don’t claim to estimate the socially-optimal “size of finance” at 8.267% of GDP, so there...After all, if a bunch of academics could sit around our offices and decide which industries were “too big,” which ones were “too small,” and close our papers with “policy recommendations” to remedy the matter, central planning would have worked.  A little...modesty suggests we focus on documenting the distortions, not pronouncing on optimal industry sizes.  Documenting distortions has also been, historically, far more productive than pronouncing on the optimal size of industries, optimal compensation of executives, “global imbalances,” “savings gluts,” “excessive consumption,” or other outcomes. 
Cochrane also describes how we should go about documenting the distortions:
We start with the first welfare theorem: loosely, supply, demand and competition lead to socially beneficial arrangements.  Yet the world around often doesn’t obviously conform to simple supply and demand arguments...First, maybe there is something about the situation we don’t understand. Durable institutions and arrangements, despite competition and lack of government interference, sometimes take us years to understand. Second, maybe there is a “market failure,” an externality, public good, natural monopoly, asymmetric information, or missing market, that explains our puzzle. Third, we often discover a “government failure,” that the puzzling aspect of our world is an unintended consequence of law or regulation. The regulators got captured, the market innovated around a regulation, or legal restrictions stop supply and demand from working. 
This list applies to almost any policy question in all of economics. Sometimes, policy fails. Sometimes, the market fails. And sometimes things are working better than we realize, with our limited data and models.

In casual discussions of finance in the media and blogs, we've heard all of these ideas before. The idea that finance is excessively large due to collusion with the government (policy failure) is probably the most prominent - this is the idea that big banks have the government in their pocket, allowing them to dump their risk onto the taxpayer (through bailouts) while keeping their gains for themselves. Market failure - "How does making 10 billion trades a minute benefit anyone?" - is also something you hear about. And of course, there is always the question of "If large parts of finance are valueless, why would people, especially rich people who are probably pretty savvy, pay for these things? Maybe value is being created and we just don't understand it."

It's important to belabor this last point. Economists know some things, maybe a lot of things, but this is absolutely dwarfed by the size of the things we don't know and don't understand. If this blog has had one "unifying theme," it would be the depth of our ignorance. So when economists urge caution in using policy to change large sectors of the economy, this doesn't necessarily mean "We know that the free market is always perfect and good and that policy can't help." (That is something that ideological libertarians often say, and I think it's extremely unhelpful for the econ profession when they say it.)

Instead, caution about policy is very similar to doctors' maxim of "first, do no harm." As a doctor, you wouldn't say "I can't figure out how this organ is helping the body function, so let's just take it out." Similarly, it would be foolish to say "I don't see how this finance industry is adding value, so let's regulate the heck out of it." We start with the presumption that things are there for a reason - in biology, because evolution put them there, and in economics, because...evolution put them there.

Of course, if the organ explodes and threatens the rest of the body, then you take it out. And when an industry explodes, like the finance industry did, you use policy to manage the damage. And if you can, you figure out why this organ, or this industry, tends to explode, and you figure out if there are ways you can prevent an explosion, or see it coming, without creating nasty side effects.

But the question of whether finance is unstable and tends to explode (and how to deal with that) is very different from the question of whether its compensation is equal to its value added. People should understand that difference!

Anyway, on to the meat of the issue. Again, there's way too much for one blog post, so I'll just add a few thoughts of my own. Really, you should go and read both. Twice.

In their JEP article, Greenwood and Scharfstein chart the well-known growth of the finance industry in America. They identify which areas of finance have grown. Basically, the big growth areas were 1) asset management, and 2) housing-related finance. Asset management grew because a lot of assets went up a lot in value (think of the stock boom in the 1990s), and asset managers continued to charge the same fees as before. When assets do better, the same percentage fee gets you a lot more money, so this caused the finance sector to grow. As for housing-related finance, this has been much-discussed in the media; it includes shadow banking and the entire apparatus that was developed to handle trading of mortgage-backed assets.

Greenwood & Scharfstein also briefly discuss ways that these expanded activities might cost more than their value-added. Cochrane's essay, on the other hand, is all about this question. Cochrane basically runs down the full list of finance-sector activities whose value has been called into question, and discusses the ways that each activity might add value. Handing your money to an asset manager and paying a proportional fee, for example, may be highly preferable to doing your own asset-picking, which research shows to be a losing game. Here's Cochrane:
Individual investors, many of whom actively manage their portfolios and whose decisions in doing so are the stuff [of] many behavioral biases, may be doing a lot better with 1% active management fee than actively managing on their own. As a matter of fact, individual investors are moving from active funds to passive funds, and fees in each fund are declining. Many of their fee advisers are bundling more and more services, such as tax and estate planning, which easily justify fees. At least naiveté is declining over time. 
Quite true. And I think Cochrane leaves out another possible function of money managers - the "money doctors" idea being promulgated by Andrei Schleifer. This is the idea that even if people are willing to take risks in exchange for returns, they have emotional fear of actually pulling the trigger and investing in long-term, high-return assets like stocks. Asset managers, by holding rich people's hands and appearing very professional and knowledgeable, calm this fear, much as doctors make people less afraid of taking pills. Even a money manager whose fees exceed his "alpha" may be creating value for society by overcoming human anxiety and stopping rich people's capital from sitting trapped in big stacks of gold bars in their basements. Voila - value creation.

Then again, I think Cochrane also leaves out a reason for concern. We know people are bad at picking stocks, in large part because they trade too much. What if people are bad at picking asset managers for exactly the same reason? If individual investors (or institutional investors like pension fund managers) act like "funds of funds", might they not switch their money rapidly from hedge fund to hedge fund, chasing recent performance, much like day traders ineptly picking stocks? This sort of "higher-level over-trading" could be very costly and bad for markets - after all, haven't we all heard the horror stories of hedge funds who saw a big opportunity coming, but had to close out their position and take a loss because their investors backed out too soon? That sort of thing could create large costs for asset managers, who are then forced to pass on those costs to investors via higher fees. Voila - value destruction.

As for the heavy trading we observe in financial markets, it seems to be necessary in order to incorporate information into the prices of financial assets. Of course, it could create problems as well. Cochrane sums up the dilemma very nicely:
I conclude that information trading...sits at the conflict of two externalities / public goods. On the one hand...“price impact” means that traders are not able to appropriate the full value of the information they bring, so there can be too few resources devoted to information production (and digestion, which strikes me as far more important). On the other hand, as Greenwood and Scharfstein point out, information is a non-rival good, and its exploitation in financial markets is a tournament (first to use it gets all the benefit) so the theorem that profits you make equal the social benefit of its production is false. It is indeed a waste of resources to bring information to the market a few minutes early, when that information will be revealed for free a few minutes later.  Whether we have “too much” trading, too many resources devoted to finding information that somebody already has in will be revealed in a few minutes, or “too little” trading, markets where prices go for long times not reflecting important information, as many argued during the financial crisis, seems like a topic which neither theory nor empirical work has answered with any sort of clarity.
Exactly.

Cochrane goes on to discuss "information trading" in great detail, and I encourage you to read everything else he has to say on the topic.

One related area of research that Cochrane doesn't mention, by the way, concerns the question of excess volatility, as famously discovered by Robert Shiller and demonstrated repeatedly since then. Even an asset market that is "efficient" in the academic-finance-prof sense of the word - i.e., unpredictable - may still swing more wildly than the real value of the assets. This can happen if people trade based on "noise" - if they believe that false information is actually true. A lot of the "information trading" people do may actually just serve to incorporate false information, rumors, and noise into the prices. That's clearly not a value-adding activity, and it does incur trading costs. This could be closely related to the tendency of investors to over-trade, but at an aggregate level instead of an individual level. If there's something coordinating the "noise traders" - some sort of fad or mass sentiment or herd behavior - then the same force that causes people to switch their stock holdings too often might cause markets to gyrate, racking up trading costs but destroying value. This is a separate issue from the issue of "tournaments", and also one that needs to be answered quantitatively (again, easier said than done!).

Cochrane also discusses the "shadow banking system" that was set up to do housing finance in the 2000s. I won't go over all that, but you should read it. I would, however, like to highlight this interesting point:

In any case, following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and perhaps more importantly the collapse of short-term interest rates to zero and the innovation that bank reserves pay interest, this form of “shadow banking” has essentially ceased to exist. RIP.   
To drive home this point (and to complain about any analysis of the size of finance that stops in 2007), here are two graphs representing the size of the “shadow banking system,” culled from other papers. From Adrian and Ashcraft (2012, p. 24), the size of the securitized debt market... 
 
And from Gorton and Metrick (2012), a different slice of securitized debt markets:  


This highlights an interesting point that often gets lost in discussions like this: Value-destroying activities often get naturally eliminated over time. This is evolution at work.

There are other examples. For instance, in Liar's Poker, Michael Lewis describes his job as basically being the ripping off of fools. As a bond salesman for Salomon Brothers in the 80s, he basically had a rolodex full of fools, many of them in Europe. When a client wanted to rip off a fool, he would call up Salomon, and Michael Lewis would find a fool to take the bad end of the trade, earning middleman fees in the process. Or sometimes, Salomon traders themselves, doing "proprietary trades" with the firm's own portfolio, would do the ripping off. In any case, eventually the fools wised up, and Salomon collapsed and was bought out. That wasn't the end of "face-ripping," though, as the broker-dealer industry came to call the practice. If you believe Greg Smith, it was alive and well at Goldman Sachs in the 2000s. Note that it's perfectly legal to take a fool's money. Broker-dealers have no fiduciary duty to their clients when acting as middlemen. But it still seems like a value-destroying activity, and over time, a firm or industry that does it will lose its reputation and lose its clients. That is evolution in action.

The real questions here are, 1) how long will evolution take, 3) what will be the collateral damage when a value-destroying business dies out, and 3) can policy act faster than evolution, in a reliable manner, to curb value-destroying industries before nature curbs them?

In other words, the bar for policy intervention to curb value-destroying industries should be pretty high here. Eventually, swindlers, hucksters, and useless rentiers will be driven from the market. When we contemplate giving them a kick to speed them on their way out, not only must we ask ourselves "Is this activity value-creating?", but also "Can policy improve the situation fast enough, and safely enough, to justify the possibility that policy might make a mistake?" Just as in medicine, many treatments may not be wort the risk, even if they are effective.

Anyway, this is getting long, and I've barely even scratched the surface of the relevant issues. You can spend your entire life thinking about these issues, and barely even scratch the surface (though you may add lots of value to society!). If you are interested in the question of whether finance is worth it, go read Greenwood & Scharfstein, and go read Cochrane. But don't expect to come away satisfied that you know the answers! As in many areas of human endeavor, the size of our understanding is dwarfed by the size of our ignorance.
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Conspiracy Thinking and Insanity

Yesterday I blogged about the nature of paranoid-schizophrenic thought processes. I mentioned that many times, paranoid delusions are persecutorial in theme.

Somewhere between 6% and 20% of the American public
(depending on whose stats you believe) think
the moon landings were an elaborate hoax.
When a persecutorial thought is bizarre-sounding by accepted social norms (admittedly a fuzzy criterion, but that's what it comes down to) and has no provable basis in fact, yet a person clings to such thoughts as though they are perfectly legitimate (perfectly factual), the thoughts in question can be said to constitute delusional thinking.

All of us engage in paranoid fantasies from time to time, and some of those thoughts (if they're persistent enough, and deeply believed) can probably be called delusional.

But what happens when a sizable group of people latches onto the same delusional thoughts?

Answer: Sometimes it becomes a political faction.

Alexander Zaitchik, writing in an article called "Patriot Paranoia: A Look at the Top Ten Conspiracy Theories," points out:

Over the last two decades, a far-right conspiracy culture of self-proclaimed "Patriots" has emerged in which the United States government itself is viewed as a mortal threat to everything from constitutional democracy to the survival of the human race. This conspiracy revival — which has been accompanied by the explosive growth of Patriot groups over the last year and a half — kicked into overdrive with the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, who is seen by Patriots as a foreign-born Manchurian candidate sent by forces of the so-called "New World Order" to destroy American sovereignty and institute one-world socialist government.

Zaitchik points to such popular right-wing conspiracy theories as the idea that military research at Fort Detrick was behind the avian flu virus (or the AIDS virus) and that the U.S. government itself deliberately brought down NYC's Twin Towers (and/or nearby buildings) through controlled demolition, in order to begin instituting a police state (with repeal of personal freedoms, increased ease of wiretapping, and mysterious goings-on by a Homeland Security agency tasked with spying on, and detaining, ordinary citizens). To be fair, the latter bit of delusional nonsense isn't just a far-right theory. There are those on the far left who also spout the "9-11 Attack as Government Plot" line of bull.

Being open to bizarre ideas (such as the notion that the moon landings might have been an elaborate hoax) doesn't make you crazy ipso facto. But clinging to such ideas to the point where you're unwilling to consider evidence-based alternatives clearly puts you on a different part of the sanity/insanity continuum than the rest of us. Particularly if you're living your life around the paranoid idea(s) in question.

Personally, I consider the moon-landing-hoaxers and the 9-11 conspiracy theorists to be a bit crazy. Not full-on psychotic, of course (although some no doubt are). But such people are definitely engaging in psychotomimetic thinking. And they live outside social norms. That alone makes them crazier than the rest of us.

The bottom line? Sanity and insanity are not absolutes. They're imaginary goal posts on a playing field that runs the gamut between normal and abnormal. It's a good idea to know what part of the playing field you're spending most of your time on. If you lack enough self-awareness even to do that, look out. Consider it a danger sign.
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When Is a Crazy Thought a Crazy Thought?

The other day I was reading a chapter-in-progress from Sally's schizophrenia memoir. It's a chapter describing "a day in the life" from her most florid psychotic period twelve years ago. In it, she describes seeing "coded messages" in the arrangement of everyday objects (like toothbrushes and bars of soap), "messages" that were being crafted just for her by nameless spies intent on messing with her head.

(By the way, if you want to see the book chapter I'm talking about, in draft form, Sally and I will be sending it out in a few days to everybody who has signed up for book updates. See the form at the bottom of this page if you want to be on our mailing list.)

Sally's cognitive parsing process, when she was in the midst of psychosis, was undeniably bizarre, but there was always logic behind it. Her delusional thoughts weren't just random, fleeting figments. They were reasoned thoughts. The schizophrenic mind puts a huge amount of effort into trying to decipher sensory reality according to rules (rules that make sense to the schizophrenic mind).

Many of Sally's delusions were persecutorial in nature: They're out to get me. The idea that a nameless, invisible "them" (or "they") might be "out to get you" sounds laughable to those of us who consider ourselves "sane." And yet, this type of thinking is actually quite common. When you listen to far-right-wing rhetoric on talk radio (or coming from commentators on the Fox News Channel), what do you hear? Quite often, you hear paranoid rants about how "the government" is trying to take away your basic freedoms (or your money, your gun rights, your right to worship, or what have you). If it's not the government that's out to get you, then it's those pesky secular humanists, or perhaps the Trilateral Commission, or maybe the Freemasons acting in concert with the Illuminati, or maybe nameless, faceless forces sympathetic to the New World Order.

Paranoid thoughts of this general type are extremely common. A 2006 study by researchers at the Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London found, in surveying 1,200 "normal people," that 
  • over 40% of people regularly worry that negative comments are being made about them
  • 27% think that people deliberately try to irritate them
  • 20% worry about being observed or followed
  • 10% think that someone "has it in" for them
  • 5% worry that there's a conspiracy to harm them
These sorts of thoughts are qualitatively no different than thoughts that someone with paranoid schizophrenia would have. They're "crazy thoughts."

When do paranoid thoughts become pathological delusions? For someone with schizophrenia, paranoid thoughts tend to be greater in number; more frequent in occurrence; more elaborate; and more believable, than for the rest of us. A person with schizophrenia usually believes fervently in the factual basis of his or her most bizarre thoughts, to the point of becoming obsessed with them; and the overall effect is to leave the person confused and full of fear, to the point where the person might be terrified to step into the next room, let alone leave the house.

One of the things I've learned from talking to Sally (and reading her book manuscript) that has fascinated me is the extent to which "normal people" think crazy thoughts.

Perhaps it shouldn't be so surprising. After all, societal norms establish the limits of "normal" thinking and behavior (by definition). Sanity is thus, to a degree, socially constructed. Words like "sane" and "insane" are artificial constructs that have no objective meaning. We all live somewhere on a sane/insane continuum.

Consider the fact that schizophrenia sufferers often associate specific meanings with individual numbers (perhaps associating "anger" with the number four, say). Many clinicians consider this sort of illogical association to be a hallmark of psychotic ideation. And yet, most "normal" people believe thirteen to be an unlucky number, which is fundamentally no different from a schizophrenic person believing that four means anger. (There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of very tall buildings in the United States that have no thirteenth floor, precisely because so many people are convinced of thirteen's potential for evil.) Believing thirteen is "unlucky" doesn't make you mentally ill. Western society accepts the idea that thirteen is unlucky, even though it's a profoundly bizarre concept, qualitatively no different from a "crazy person's" thoughts. But if you believe that all whole numbers from one to fifty have specific individual meanings, that doesn't fit with society's norms. And if ideas about numbers are coming into your head all the time, out of control, causing you to feel so much anxiety that you can't go about your daily business, that's a problem; that's mental illness.

I thought I knew a lot about these sorts of things before reading Sally's book, but as I read each freshly written chapter, I find I'm still learning new things, making fresh associations, filling in the gaps of (mis)understanding; having new ideas. Some of them a little crazy.

It's exciting to see Sally's book coming together. When she finishes it, it'll be quite a read.
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The Serif Readability Myth

I've been involved in publishing all my life, and like many others I've always accepted as axiomatic the notion that typefaces with serifs (such as Times-Roman) are, in general, are more readable than non-serif typefaces (e.g., Helvetica). It never occurred to me that there was any doubt about the matter. Were the monks who invented serifs and other text ornamentations merely engaging in idle doodling? Weren't they consciously intending to increase the legibility of the important documents they were transcribing?

It turns out that, as with so many of the things we "know" are right, the idea that serif typefaces are more readable than non-serif typefaces simply isn't supported by the evidence.

At first, I scoffed at the idea that what everybody in the design world knows to be "obviously true" simply isn't. But then I happened upon the remarkable 1999 Ph.D. dissertation of Ole Lund (then of Høgskolen i Gjøvik), titled "Knowledge construction in typography: the case of legibility research and the legibility of sans serif typefaces" (download here).

It's impossible to do justice to Lund's stunningly thorough (and beautifully written) 287-page dissertation in a short space. You have to read it for yourself.

Lund undertakes an exceptionally detailed and critical review of 28 typeface legibility studies conducted between 1896 and 1997. He finds serious methodological problems in nearly all of them. Legibility itself is still poorly defined, even today, and is not well distinguished from readability. It turns out a surprising number of otherwise convincing "legibility studies" have been based on reading speed or reading comprehension, which have no bearing on glyph recognition per se. Reading speed is now known to be mainly a function of cognition speed, which varies considerably from individual to individual and is not related in any straightforward way (and possibly in no way) to typeface design. Reading comprehension is even further removed from type design.

Even if legibility is defined in terms of symbol recognition, one must decide how, exactly, such a thing is to be measured. Two common methodologies are variation of time of exposure (an attempt to measure speed of perception) and variation of distance ("perceptibility at a distance"). There are also methods based on type size. All have complicating factors. Harris [3] points to evidence showing that it is very likely that time of exposure methods as well as the variable distance method favor typefaces with relative large strokewidth, regardless of serifs. Type size is complicated by the fact that larger point-size fonts are not shaped the same as smaller point-size fonts, for a given font.

Designer George E. Mack, commenting on the concept of legibility in Communication Arts [5], said:

The basic concept is so tangled up in decipherability, pattern recognition, reading speed, retention, familiarity, visual grouping, aesthetic response, and real life vs. test conditions that contradictory results can be obtained for the same type faces under different test conditions.

Part of our "accepted wisdom" on the legibility of serif typefaces comes from research in cognitive psychology (most famously the work of Bouma[1]) around the notion that words are recognized not on a strict letter-by-letter basis but by the outlines or contours made around the word shape. This research has long since been shot down, as pointed out by Kevin Larson [4], who notes: "Word shape is no longer a viable model of word recognition. The bulk of scientific evidence says that we recognize a word’s component letters, then use that visual information to recognize a word."

One of the most-cited "authorities" on serif legibility is Cyril Burt, whose 1955 article [2] in The British Journal of Statistical Psychology (a journal he was the editor of) seemed to end the debate on whether serif typefaces are more readable than non-serif typefaces. However, Burt's statements about the supposed superiority of serif fonts turned out to be nothing more than idle conjecture dressed up to sound scientific. After his death in 1971, Burt's landmark work on the heritability of I.Q. was discredited (and his reputation destroyed) based on his use of nonexistent data and nonexistent coauthors. Rooum [7] and others found Burt's typeface research to be bogus as well (his coauthors on the 1955 typography paper seem to be fictitious). Today, anyone who cites Burt is citing discredited nonsense, basically.

So before you go around claiming that serif typefaces are easier to read than sans-serif typefaces, you might want to do a little checking around. The embarrassing truth is, there's no solid research to back up that claim. It's one of many myths you (and I) have accepted as true, that isn't.


References

1. Bouma, H. 1973. "Visual Interference in the Parafoveal Recognition of Initial and Final Letters of Words," Vision Research, 13, 762-782.

2. Cyril Burt, W.F. Cooper, and J.L. Martin. 1955. 'A psychological study of typography'.
The British Journal of Statistical Psychology, vol. 8, pt. 1, pp. 29-57.

3. Harris, J. 1973. "Confusions in letter recognition." Professional Printer, vol. 17,
no. 2, pp. 29-34

4. Larson, Kevin. 2004. "The Science of Word Recognition."

5. Mack, George E. 1979. 'Opinion/Commentary'. Communication Arts, vol. 21,
pt. 2, May/June, pp. 96-97

6. Poole, Alex. 2012. "Fighting bad typography research."

7. Rooum, Donald. 1981. "Cyril Burt's 'A psychological study of typography': a reappraisal," Typos: a journal of typography, no. 4, pp. 37-40. London College of Printing
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Riddles have no place in job interviews

I've seen "tech recruitment" from both sides of the desk. I have been a job applicant, and I have been a hiring manager. Neither role is pretty.

One of the unprettier sides of the hiring process in R&D is the on-site-interview stage, when the hiring manager (or one of his peers) gets to ask the applicant highly technical domain-knowledge questions. This can be done skillfully or poorly. It gets ugly fast when it becomes a hazing ritual based on riddle-solving.

The correct answer to riddle questions.
It's one thing to ask an open-ended technical question that lends itself to straightforward answers (e.g., "What are some things you could do to minimize the time spent in garbage collection?"). It's quite another to subject the interviewee to game-show riddles. "Four people want to cross a bridge. They all begin on the same side. You have twelve minutes to get all of them across to the other side. It is night. There is one flashlight. A maximum of two people can cross at one time," etc.

My advice to job-hunters: Don't hire the employer who subjects you to such assholery.

When I say "don't hire the employer," I'm referring to the fact that a job interview is a two-way process. The employer is interviewing the prospective employee, but the prospective employee is also interviewing the employer. Each is hiring the other. Both actors should be asking questions. (Reasonable questions.) Both should be engaged in meaningful conversation. Meaningless riddles are out-of-band.

Reject a riddle by asking if you can have a more concrete, job-related question. Ask if there's perhaps a difficult problem currently receiving attention in the department you'd be working in. Ask if you can take a crack at that problem, or something just like it.

If you're lucky (and if the interviewer is anywhere near as smart as he or she thinks he/she is), the interviewer will pick up on the fact that you're a serious, pragmatic individual with domain expertise and intelligence, who is anxious to apply hard-won knowledge to real-world problems. You're not a game-show contestant.

A really stubborn, inflexible interviewer will stick to the riddle strategy and defend it by saying something like "I don't really care if you get the question right, I just want to see how you think." Which is completely ludicrous. A candidate who immediately produces the "right answer" to a riddle will always impress this kind of interviewer far more than someone who doesn't. That's the whole point of riddles. If a person really wanted to "see how you think," wouldn't he or she want to get to know you a little bit, perhaps draw you out with a series of simple questions? Wouldn't it mean engaging you in two-way conversation about something meaningful?

Ask yourself: Do you want to work for the kind of manager (or company) that sees its new hires as successful game-show contestants?

The right thing to do if you're an interviewer who wants to see how a candidate "thinks" (or "reasons" or "problem-solves") is to ask open-ended questions that are both job-related, and call for domain expertise.

If you're hiring a Java programmer, by all means ask an open-ended question like "What would you do if an application is failing because of OutOfMemoryErrors?" This could lead to discussions (and further questions) around a whole host of issues relating to checked and unchecked exceptions, memory leaks, garbage collection, design patterns, good coding practices, debugging strategies, etc. Within a few minutes, you should know a lot more about the applicant's qualifications than whether or not he or she bought this year's "most asked job interview riddles" book before coming to the interview.

Let's be clear. There's absolutely no need, ever, to subject an interviewee to questions for which there's a "trick answer." The hiring process isn't about tricks and games, is it?

If you're a job candidate and you feel an interview is going in an inappropriate direction, it's up to you to speak out. Don't forget, you're doing some interviewing here, too. Ask politely if you can have another question. If the interviewer sticks with riddles and says "I just want to see how you think," you're dealing with a certain kind of person (colloquially known as a braying jackass), so dumb it down and (politely) ask the interviewer if you can have another question, job-related, that will allow you to demonstrate how you think. You may even have to suggest possible questions yourself, if the interviewer is a bit thick.

Hire an employer who values the real you, not the game-show you. Unless, of course, you're into humiliation and Who's the Alpha Dog bullshit, in which case, may you find happiness and fulfillment together.
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Gold, gold, GOLD!!!



On November 11, 2011, Zero Hedge ran a post from a site called GoldCore. The title was: "Gold Over EUR 1,300 - On Way to ‘Infinity’ on Eurozone Contagion?" Here is what it said:
The unprecedented scale of the [European] debt crisis means that inflation and currency devaluations will almost certainly result from the crisis. Savers and those on fixed incomes will be very vulnerable as they were in the stagflation of the 1970’s and in the economic meltdowns seen in Argentina, Russia and in Belarus as we speak... 
However, the US is itself facing a debt crisis which is also of a monumental scale. It is of a scale that it cannot be resolved by the usual kneejerk resorting to the printing presses and today’s equivalent panacea - computer credit creation... 
Ron Paul gave another perceptive interview to CNBC yesterday and warned of hyperinflation and the possibility that the dollar could become worthless. 
When asked how high the gold price would go and why, he responded: 
“well, the question is how much lower is the dollar going to go in purchasing power? and I said to infinity unless we change our ways."
Here, courtesy of Goldprice.org, is a picture of gold prices over the past two years. Note that the Zero Hedge post appeared a few months after the peak:


For comparison, courtesy of Yahoo Finance, here is the S&P 500 over the same period:


Now, if you believed the Zero Hedge post, and immediately went out and invested $100 in gold, you would now have $17 less than a friend who ran out and invested $100 in an S&P index fund.

On March 6, 2012, Zero Hedge ran a post of its own, titled "Stay Long Gold", citing Morgan Stanley. If you believed that Zero Hedge post, and immediately went out and invested $100 in gold, you would now have $9.60 less than a friend who ran out and invested $100 in an S&P index fund.

Goldbugs and Zero Hedge fans who read these facts tend to make one or more of the following responses:

1. "You're cherry-picking. Go back 5 years and see how much gold has beaten stocks. Or 10 years."

2. "Look how much money central banks are printing. Obviously, fiat money is going to become worthless, and gold will be left as the one true form of money."

3. "OK, dude, whatever you say, look how much money I made investing in gold! Who's the fool now, huh?"

4. "Gold and stocks aren't substitutes. Gold is an important part of a diversified portfolio."

Number 1, of course, is just counter-cherry-picking. The S&P has beaten gold over every 30-year period of history, ever. Why 30 years? Well, it's a standard "long-term" investment horizon. But the same is true for 40 years, 50 years, etc.

Number 2 really fails to understand a basic idea about financial markets. If it's obvious that central bank money-printing will drive up the value of gold, why isn't that fact already incorporated into gold prices? In other words, the only central bank actions that should make gold prices rise are surprise actions - like printing even more money than people thought.

Now, Zero Hedge and the whole "goldbugosphere" tries to push the idea that they understand macroeconomics better than everyone else out there - that what is "obvious" to them is not obvious to most of the world, which is still in thrall to (Keynesians, neoclassical econ, Xenu, take your pick). 

But this also does not mean that gold prices can be expected to rise. Because even if it's true - suppose goldbugs are much much wiser and savvier than the rest of humanity - the only reason goldbugs wouldn't have already been able to push gold to its optimal price would be if goldbugs were liquidity constrained. But if that's the case, the only people who will believe in the predictions of higher gold prices will, by definition, be people who are unable to take advantage of their superior wisdom and savvy.

As for Number 3, note how it exploits a fairly well-known behavioral bias: Envy. When the gold flogger proudly boasts that "I made a fortune in gold!", people feel like unless they do the same, they aren't as smart as the guy making the boast. There's a knee-jerk psychological reaction of "If you can do it, well by golly, I can too!"

But notice how crazy this is. Even if you're as smart as the goldbug, it doesn't mean that you can replicate his success just by buying the same thing he bought. In fact, chances are you can't. Chances are, the huge gains that gold has seen over the past decade were a one-off event, not to repeated anytime soon. 

Investing is an area of human endeavor in which copying other people is not a surefire route to success. This makes it different from many other areas of life. If someone says "I tried the Atkins diet and I lost 40 lbs.!", then - assuming they're not BSing you - there's a pretty good chance that you too can lose 40 lbs. with the Atkins diet. Just copy best practice. But in investing, "copying best practice" by buying what the winners buy is actually just herd behavior, and is likely to make you lose money. Gold is not the Atkins Diet.

Of course, Zero Hedge knows this, and it knows that by creating this myth that "anyone can get rich by investing in gold", it can play on your own behavioral biases. Note that this is not the only bias they cleverly exploit - they also try to play to your masculinity in order to strengthen your overconfidence.

(As for Number 4, well, it might be right. But you shouldn't need Zero Hedge articles to tell you to diversify your portfolio! And let's be real: articles with titles like "Gold headed to infinity" and "Stay long gold" are not really articles about portfolio diversification.)

Note how there's a common theme here: Past performance is no guarantee of future results. According to "efficient" markets theory, past performance is unrelated to future results. According to behavioral finance research, future results will actually tend to reverse past performance, possibly because so many silly people exhibit herd behavior and jump on bandwagons.

Of course, as anyone knows who has ever tried to reason with goldbugs, this post is likely to fall mostly on deaf ears. But if you've had Zero Hedgie types brag to you about how much money they made investing in gold, don't feel bad. Look at their results in the last year and a half. And quietly snicker.


Update: as a commenter pointed out, Zero Hedge is probably just "talking their book". They own a bunch of gold, so right up until the point they're ready to dump it, they'll say "Buy, buy, buy!" Then they dump it, then they start yelling "Sell, sell, sell!" If it works, it's the old pump-and-dump scam, which is illegal when you do it to a stock, but perfectly legal to do when it's a whole asset class, like gold. Of course, Zero Hedge probably doesn't have a lot of ability to move gold prices, but why not try? In the meantime, they make money selling ads for their website. There's really no downside for them.
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