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The Eurozone chain-gang

I was recently trying to explain to a friend (in the U.S.) what's going on in Europe. The best analogy I could come up with is a chain-gang.

Imagine a chain-gang of 17 prisoners who are bound, one to the other, by chains.

At least four of the prisoners (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal) are mordibly obese midgets.

The chain-gang has escaped into the forest and is running away from their oppressors. But after running a while, the four weakest members (mentioned above) are out of breath, and they stop running.

The fittest members of the chain gang, represented by Germany, say to the laggards: "Come on, now. Let's keep going. We're making great progress. Don't stop now."

But the laggards are out of breath, sweating heavily, and they say: "We need to eat something. We're exhausted. We can't go on without something to eat."

And the fittest members of the chain-gang say: "Nonsense. You're obese. You need to get up and start running."

And the obese ones say: "But we didn't choose to be obese. This is a genetic condition. We inherited the 'obese' gene. Don't penalize us just because we're obese."

And the fittest say: "We're not just going to turn over our food to you, just because you're exhausted and hungry. You're fat. You need to go on a starvation diet. And you need to exercise. So get up. And run."

This seems to me to sum up what's going on, economically, in Europe right now.

The Germans don't want to just give hard-earned wealth to states like Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, who are (on at least some level) plainly undeserving.

But the chain-gang cannot make progress unless the weaklings stand up and move.

Making an obese person go on a starvation diet (and sudddenly start exercising) is neither humane nor realistic. But Angela Merkel has demonstrated that even after 80-odd years, nothing much has changed in Germany. She has revealed the quintessential German nature: neither humane nor realistic.

What's needed now in Europe is a solution, for the less-well-off nations, that is both humane and realistic.

It's like a commentator on my favorite TV network (CNBC) said. Squabbles of the kind we're seeing in Europe right now used to be resolved at the point of a bayonet. They now need to be resolved at the point of a pen. And that requires significantly more time and talent.





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Carbon taxes won't work. Here's what will.


Or, "In which I am regrettably forced to heartlessly massacre the entire Pigou Club, of which my advisor has just declared himself a member." (Actually, this was the original title of the post, but I realized it wouldn't fit in a Mark Thoma link bullet, so...)

It fills me with great sadness to write this post, since I think that global warming is a huge threat, that economists should think more about externalities, that Pigovian taxes in general are a great idea, and that most of the people in the Pigou Club are intelligent, well-meaning, insightful, civic-minded folk, i.e. exactly the type of folks we need more of in this country. But I can no longer in good conscience stop myself from making the following argument:

Carbon taxes are not going to work.

Instead of one simple overwhelming reason for thinking this, I have a number of reasons that all pile themselves into a mountain of evidence. In no particular order, here they are.

1. Carbon taxes are politically infeasible in the U.S. A few people have tried to introduce carbon tax bills. There has been essentially no interest. This may be because there is no concentrated special-interest constituency for carbon taxes (the Pigou Club notwithstanding), or because politicians instinctively realize the existence of some of the other reasons I'm going to cite. Also note that the more well-known, Obama-supported "cap-and-trade" idea also went nowhere fast.

I cited this reason first because it's the weakest; political infeasibility should not stop economists and other intellectuals from recommending the right policy.

2. Global carbon taxes present a basically insoluble coordination problem. The U.S. emits about 1/6 of global carbon emissions. Cut U.S. emissions by 30% (a huge cut) and you cut global emissions by 5%; not enough to make a dent in global warming. Now realize that China, which now emits about 1/4 of global carbon emissions, has now twice scuttled international efforts to coordinate a reduction in carbon emissions (first at Copenhagen and then at Durban). How about Europe and Japan and Russia and Canada? Well, they agreed to carbon restrictions at Kyoto, and then promptly broke their quotas and went right on increasing their emissions.

Coordination problems are really really hard.

3. Carbon taxes are undermined by free trade. If you put a tax on carbon-emitting activity in the U.S., it'll raise the domestic price of (for example) coal. This will provide an incentive for U.S. coal miners to export their coal to other countries, especially China, as they are now trying to do. It will also provide an incentive for Americans to buy more imports from countries where it is still cheap to burn coal (e.g. China). In other words, if you tax the burning of American coal by American companies, you will increase the burning of American coal by Chinese companies, and the de facto burning of Chinese coal by American consumers. These effects will not completely cancel out the effect of a U.S. carbon tax, but they will work against it substantially. The only way to stop this would be to tax both carbon exports and the implied carbon content of imports. This would lead to big rises in tariffs.

It is hard to imagine the Pigou Club, most of whose members support free trade, uniting around the import/export tariffs needed to make a U.S. carbon tax work.

(Addendum: And you know what the U.S. can't tax? Cheap-carbon Chinese-made products replacing expensive-carbon U.S.-made products in global markets.)

4. The economic costs of carbon taxes are very hard to estimate. Pigovian taxes work by balancing the benefit of the tax with the costs. The cost of a carbon tax is the economic activity that is curtailed by the tax. But this is very hard to measure. Taxing carbon would tax driving, which would make commuting much harder for a lot of the Americans who have chosen to live in suburbs. A big carbon tax could conceivably make those suburbs economically unviable, through agglomeration effects, requiring much of the country to completely overhaul its physical infrastructure. Those agglomeration effects are very hard to predict, and might be very large. And I almost never see economists thinking about agglomeration, urban, or spatial effects or taking them into account.

Now I must admit that this reason is slightly disingenuous, since I think the benefits of higher density are massively unappreciated, and that it would be a good thing for us to dismantle much of the far-flung exurbs and replace them with walkable neighborhoods accessible by public transit. But I think that once the members of the Pigou Club start seriously thinking about the infrastructure costs associated with taxing driving, they will be less sure of their case.

5. Carbon taxes can be revoked in the future. When it comes to global warming, what matters is the total amount of carbon in the atmosphere, not the rate of emissions. Carbon stays in the atmosphere for anywhere from decades to centuries, and maybe even a lot longer than that. If a carbon tax passes at a time when the harm is relatively small, but is revoked as soon as fossil fuel prices go up (due to increasing extraction costs, i.e. "peak oil" and "peak coal"), the total effect of the carbon tax will be close to zero. And I think there is ample evidence that carbon taxes would be revoked as soon as voters started feeling pain at the pump, since "cut gas taxes" is the first thing you hear politicians saying when gas prices go up.

6. A little bit of emissions reduction is barely better than none at all. As mentioned in the previous point, carbon stays in the atmosphere a long time. What this means is that to work, carbon taxes have to reduce emissions a lot; for you nerds out there, the benefit of emissions reductions is highly convex in the amount of reduction. When it comes to carbon, a little bit of reduction is essentially no better than none at all.

And I think the previous 4 reasons are sufficient to show that a U.S. carbon tax would only reduce global emissions by a little.

There you have it: no single deal-breaker, but an accumulated weight of reasons to think that a carbon tax won't have any significant impact on global warming. The Pigou Club is a good bunch and their idea is a good try, but it just won't be enough.

So what do we do? Throw our hands up in despair and hope that global warming won't be as bad as many fear? No. I think that there is something our government can do to make a huge dent in carbon emissions, in a relatively short time frame.

 The International Energy Agency reports that America's carbon dioxide emissions have fallen by 450 million tons in the past five years. That is a drop of about 7.5% - not a slowing in the growth of emissions, but an absolute decrease. It's a big, big drop. Bigger, in fact, than any other country experienced over the same time period.

What caused this huge drop? Natural gas. Because of the shale gas boom, America has been switching from coal power to gas power, and gas emits less carbon for a given amount of energy. Now, this is only a partial solution, since gas does emit carbon, and since there's not enough gas in the world for every country to make this shift. But what it shows is that when there is a low-carbon technology available that is cheaper than a high-carbon technology, an economy will rapidly switch to the low-carbon technology, and emissions will plummet quite rapidly. And this will happen without any sort of carbon tax, cap-and-trade-system, or other emissions-limiting policy.

So the way for the U.S. government to beat global warming is this: Subsidize research into low-carbon energy sources. For electricity generation, this essentially means solar power. Solar costs have been falling exponentially, and even without a method to store solar energy during the night, solar is already cheap enough (with not-very-large subsidies) to replace much of fossil fuel power during the daylight hours.

Government money for research and development will accelerate this process. This means both basic research (which the government, in particular the military, does far better than anybody) for breakthrough technologies, but even more importantly, it means subsidies for solar companies that make the minor, incremental improvements that add up over time, driving costs steadily down. These subsidies should be seen not as government acting as a venture capitalist - most of the supported companies will eventually fail - but as government subsidizing the kind of incremental research that is not best accomplished by Defense Department grants.

Research is a public good. The day that solar becomes cheaper than coal will be the day that China and India start mothballing their coal mines and throwing up solar factories. Yes, this means that the U.S. will be subsidizing the rest of the world. Yes, it means that cheap Chinese and Indian competition will put a lot of our own solar companies out of business (as it is doing already). But it is worth it. Since there exists no global government, the only hope of stopping global warming is for one national government to kill the problem all by itself. Saving the climate (and reducing energy costs in the process!) will be worth a whole lot of Solyndras.

So at this point some of you may be reading this and saying "Wait a second. Noah Smith wants us to ignore a policy (carbon taxes) that is supported both by clear, simple economic theory and by some of the most eminent economists in the world from both sides of the political spectrum, and instead throw heaps of taxpayers' money at a bunch of companies that we know are going to fail?" And I say: Yes. That is exactly what I want. That may sound crazy to you, but everyone is entitled to one or two crazy beliefs, aren't they?

Update: Miles points out that global warming is not the only reason to reduce fossil fuel use; it is also useful in reducing the price of oil that petrostates like Iran receive. That's a topic for another post, but I'm not sure spiking Iran's economy is worth the sacrifices it would take to unilaterally bring down the world oil price through a reduction in U.S. demand (besides, a petroleum tax would be more effective for this purpose than a general carbon tax). Miles does, however, say "I second [Noah] in advocating scientific research as the most effective way to address global warming." Yay!

Update 2: Via commenter Amy, here is a Daron Acemoglu working paper that basically says the same thing I'm saying in this post. Yay!

Update 3: In fact, there is a precedent for government doing exactly the kind of R&D effort that I'm advocating here. The technology? Fracking, which produced the current shale gas boom. The potential payoff for solar is ever greater than shale gas (since solar never runs out and produces zero carbon), so if there's any energy technology the government helps to improve, it should be solar.
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Five questions to ask before buying enterprise software

Enterprise software tends to disappoint, on many levels. The complaints are legion, but basically you're lucky if a fairly elaborate software suite (e.g., an enterprise-grade Content Management System) can be installed by an ordinary human being (not a vendor-trained consultant) in less than a day, and if you can do anything out of the ordinary without reading the documentation. Heaven help you if you actually need to implement clustering, do a complete backup of the system, or do anything at all non-trivial, on your own.

I'd like to present a fairly simple list of five questions you should ask yourself before deciding whether a particular vendor's system is good, bad, or just plain ugly. (Disclosure: I work for Adobe Systems, and most of the following examples will use Adobe's Digital Marketing Suite, in particular the Adobe CQ5 web content management part of it, as an example.)

1. Can you install a usable (fully functional) sandbox instance of the software easily, using one double-clickable file? Adobe CQ meets this test. It comes as a double-clickable JAR file that explodes its contents into the complete install footprint needed to run a fully functional instance of the product, without presenting (for example) wizards that ask you for esoteric info or demanding that you put certain values in your operating system's Java path, etc. The first time you run the CQ installer, it takes anywhere from one to three minutes to lay down the contents of the system. All subsequent starts of the system take only 15 to 60 seconds (depending on the speed of your machine).

2. Can you easily cluster the system by designating other running instances as cluster nodes (using just a URL)? Adobe CQ offers one simple dialog to enable this. Clustering takes seconds (literally) to set up. Anyone can do it. You don't have to be a systems architect, a programmer, or an über-admin.

Adding a node to a cluster is as easy as specifying a URL.

3. Can you do a backup (take a "snapshot" of the entire system, including all its artifacts, all user-added content, all code, all everything) by doing nothing more than hitting a button? Again, Adobe CQ enables this sort of functionality. And you don't have to be a skilled super-user to do it.

Want to take a snapshot of the system? Click a button.


4. Can you develop custom components from within the system, using an integrated UI, without firing up some secondary development environment (Eclipse, Visual C++, etc.)?
Adobe CQ includes its own code editor (a complete IDE, actually) with which to develop HTML, JSPs, server-side ECMAScript, OSGi bundles, and any other artifacts you might need in order to customize your system.

Develop Java classes with the integrated IDE, hot-deploy them as OSGi bundles. No bouncing the server.

5. Can you deploy arbitrarily elaborate custom applications without taking the system down and starting it back up again? Adobe CQ's infrastructure is OSGi-based, which means you can hot-deploy any number of Java classes any time you want, without bouncing the system.

I know, I know, this sounds like one big giant ad for Adobe CQ, and it is. But I've worked in enterprise software for 12 years (and in that time, I've evaluated scores of content management systems), and until now I've never encountered a large software offering (something of the scale of CQ) that could meet the challenges posed by the five questions listed above. If you know of another example, by all means leave a comment below!
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How does this "fake GDP" work?


Actually, it's incredibly easy to create fake GDP. You simply scratch my back and charge me $10, and then I scratch your back and charge you $10. Repeat that 750 billion times, and you'll double the GDP of the United States. I'm dead serious. Expenditure and income will both go up by $15 trillion, all of it in the "back-scratching services" sector.

Just have fun paying the income tax. 

Really, the question is why you'd want to create fake GDP. If you got $10 in additional income, you probably wouldn't spend it on a back scratch you didn't want. Economists typically assume that the dollar transactions that go on in our economy represent exchanges of scarce resources - that people would prefer to spend their money on things they want rather than things they have no need for.

So I just do not understand why so many people keep on insisting that our GDP before the financial crisis was "fake". Here's Steve Pearlstein:
Indeed, there is a suspicion that at least some of the downturn [in the UK] is a statistical mirage caused by the necessary adjustment to wages and prices following the bursting of that financial bubble. If the financial sector never really added as much genuine value to the economy as was indicated from all those inflated salaries and bonuses, then at least some of the decline in GDP since then may merely reflect a healthy repricing of labor, financial assets and goods across the economy rather than a worrisome loss of output. Low inflation, slowly rising employment, little or no growth in measured productivity, household incomes and GDP — these are all consistent with that story of statistical mirage.
This via Tyler Cowen.

OK, I just don't get it. First of all, if all that has changed are prices, not quantities, that should show up in the price level, as measured by the GDP deflator. Maybe Pearlstein thinks the GDP deflator is mismeasured, and that Britain has actually been experiencing a deflationary boom? How would such a thing be possible, unless some sort of secret supply shock had actually given the British economy a big boost? Is the UK secretly doing better than ever?

(Answer: No it's not. Look at unemployment.)

Anyway, if the GDP deflator is not grossly mismeasured, then the contraction in the financial sector entails not just a fall in prices, but a fall in the quantity of financial services performed. Pearlstein seems to be saying that yes, this has happened, but that this is OK, because these vanished financial services had not been adding value equal to their price.

Which makes us ask: If these services were not worth the price, why were people paying for them? People could have taken the money that they spent on financial services and spent it on cars or video games or sandwiches instead, or left it to their kids. 

If you think that people were paying for useless crap before the crisis, then you must believe that people were tricked into throwing away their money on things they didn't need or want. Maybe that's true! Maybe people in a free market can be tricked en masse into flushing their income down a toilet. George Akerlof, for example, has spent a lot of time arguing that this is not just possible, but common.

But if you believe this, you believe that free markets are not always a great way of allocating resources. If people can be tricked to such a degree that the size of the trick makes the difference between a boom and a depression, well...that's one big trick! It would be a waste of resources as big as any war, except perpetrated by the invisible hand of markets instead of the visible hand of government. In other words, it would mean that free markets tend to fail, and fail massively.

So am I getting things wrong? Do Pearlstein and others mean something else when they claim that part of GDP is a "statistical illusion"? What is this "fake GDP" they speak of, and how does it work??
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Libertarians embracing public goods, Tim Lee edition


Is America waking from its long libertarian daydream? For years, many of our brightest intellectuals embraced the simplistic idea that "government is the problem". This attitude required denying the existence of public goods, i.e. areas where government activity complements private markets rather than replacing them. As a result, we neglected roads and other infrastructure, and partially privatized prisons and the army.

However, there are clear signs that libertarians - by which I mean the intellectual vanguard of the movement, not the Ron Paul goonballs - are, as a group, reconsidering the simplistic 1970s worldview. Here's Peter Thiel calling for all sorts of public goods. Here's Alex Tabarrok doing the same. Will Wilkinson, a Cato alum, has explicitly made the argument that public goods provision by the government can enhance personal freedom (a point I've tried to make as well). And now we have Tim Lee, a Forbes writer and former Cato dude, declaring "We're all infrastructure socialists now":
Socialism means government ownership of the means of production, and governments necessarily own the land on which roads are constructed. Therefore, governments are always going to be involved in the provision of roads; the only question is what role the government should play... 
We’re all “infrastructure socialists” to some extent, the question is what kind of infrastructure socialism will give us the most efficient and competitive...market.
First, allow me to quibble with Tim's terminology (because hey, this is Blogs). "Socialism", to me, doesn't quite mean "government ownership of the means of production". Instead, it means, as Wikipedia puts it, "an economic system characterized by [government] ownership and/or control of the means of production" (emphasis mine). I think the two are very different things. A system in which the government attempts only to do those things that complement private markets does not seem like a system that is characterized by government production. Instead, it seems like one that is characterized by private production, since in such a system government activity is constructed with the intent to maximize the efficiency of the private production system, not vice versa. So let's not call public goods "socialism".

OK, quibble aside, Tim has a good point, though of course it's not necessarily true that govt. owns the land that roads are built on. Instead, it's typically the case that govt. solves a coordination problem by invoking eminent domain in order to get the roads built, or by coordinating among a large number of land owners. The larger point is that there are things that are much much much easier for government to do than private actors, and that these things often improve the efficiency of markets, and that infrastructure is a prime example.

Here's a follow-up column by Tim on the subject of subways.

This is, in my opinion, a wonderful trend. Alexander Hamilton, the father of our nation's economic system, basically made public goods (then called "internal improvements") his baby. Friedrich Hayek, the consummate libertarian of the early 20th century, supported government provision of infrastructure (as Tim Lee points out). But many American libertarians of the 70s onward scoffed at infrastructure, viewing it as pork or waste. Of course this can happen (witness Japan in the 1990s), but neither is it true that infrastructure is optimally provided by the private sector. To get the right amount of infrastructure, our only hope is to make government work optimally rather than getting government "out of the way". That America's libertarians are returning to this view is, in my opinion, the most positive intellectual trend happening today.

So, all together now, let's repair the roads!
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Does Steve Williamson think printing money can't cause inflation?


OK, OK, one more quick post and then back to work!!

In my last post, I linked to a Miles Kimball post explaining the theory behind Quantitative Easing. Well, it didn't take long for Miles to come under fire from the econ blogosphere's resident monetary policy skeptic, English saxophone player Washington University professor Steve Williamson. Steve thinks Quantitative Easing (printing money and buying assets) can't possibly boost GDP. He has three reasons for thinking this:

1. Since inflation has been rising since the beginning of 2011, we must be above the natural rate of output (if indeed there is a natural rate of output).

2. The Modigliani-Miller theorem says that changes in the Fed's portfolio of assets (and, hence, QE) must have no effect.

3. Actually I can't understand the third argument at all. This doesn't necessarily mean that Steve's writing is akin to that of William Faulkner on bath salts; instead, it probably reflects my poor reading comprehension.

I actually am not quite sure what to think about the first argument, so I won't address it here. And I don't get what the third argument even is (sorry!). So I'll discuss the second argument: the idea that QE is rendered powerless by the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. Steve writes:
Another useful piece of finance is the Modigliani Miller theorem. Kimball might want to explain to us why, if the Fed issues reserves (overnight liabilities), and buys some other assets, and private financial intermediaries are perfectly capable of issuing overnight liabilities and buying the same assets, that the Fed's QE is not undone.
Now, Steve is not talking about the actual Modigliani-Miller theorem, which says that it doesn't matter whether a company finances itself by issuing bonds or issuing stock. Instead, he's talking about a Modigliani-Miller type result, that says that the government's portfolio is irrelevant.

The archetypical result of this type is Wallace (1981), which you can read here. Under certain highly restrictive and odd-sounding conditions, the government's asset portfolio does not affect the economy at all. One of these conditions, for example, is that the government uses lump-sum taxes to cancel out any net interest payments that it pays to, or receives from, the private sector. If that sounds weird, it's because nothing like that ever happens in the real world. Wallace, of course, freely admits this, and says his model is only intended as a benchmark.

But what if Wallace's model were really in effect? First, realize that it wouldn't just make QE ineffective, it would make Open Market Operations (i.e. the normal thing the Fed does to change interest rates when interest rates are not zero) ineffective as well. For this reason, Jim Bullard of the St. Louis Fed dismisses the Modigliani-Miller type argument. Most people think Open Market Operations really can affect GDP, such as when Paul Volcker reduced the monetary base in the early 80s.

But here's an even more important fact about the Wallace (1981) result: If this result holds, then printing money not only can't effect GDP, it can't affect inflation either. Yep. You read that right. The Modigliani-Miller type result implies that you can print as much money as you want, and prices will stay exactly the same. To quote Wallace:
Irrelevance here means that both the equilibrium consumption allocation and the path of the price level are independent of the path of the government's portfolio. (emphasis mine)
There are some other models similar to Wallace's that yield Modigliani-Miller type results, but they all have this same property.

I doubt that Steve Williamson believes that printing money can't cause inflation. In particular, this post of his from March warns that the excess reserves created by the Fed will create inflation. But if Steve is right about that, then there is no Modigliani-Miller result for QE, and this criticism of Miles Kimball's model is invalid.

Anyway, Steve should take up this argument with St. Louis Fed president Jim Bullard, who has argued forcefully that QE2, the last round of quantitative easing, had some of the effects that it couldn't have in a Wallace (1981) type model. Steve is a big Bullard fan, and will doubtlessly respect his thoughts more than that of a humble graduate student like yours truly...

Update: Miles Kimball responds. The upshot: It might take trillions and trillions of dollars of Fed asset purchases to have an effect on the real economy.

Update 2: Steve Williamson responds, explaining his reasons for believing in a Modigliani-Miller type irrelevance result for QE. He also adds a couple of criticisms of Miles' arguments at the end, but I don't understand these last points, so I can't really comment.
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Miles Kimball, the Supply-Side Liberal

Miles Kimball attempting, with some success, not to look at the camera...

Those of you who think I know anything about macroeconomics should realize that about 75% of what I think and say on the topic comes from a guy named Miles Kimball, who is my committee chair here at Michigan (the rest mostly comes from Bob Barsky, Rudi Bachmann, and Mike Elsby, with a dash of Brad DeLong's blog; also, there are a few amateurish musings like this that come from no one in particular). Now, you can get your macro directly from the man himself. Miles Kimball has a blog!

This is good news. Not only is Miles one of the smartest economists I know, but he is also one of the least politicized. This may sound odd, since he makes his political views public knowledge, and very explicitly lets them inform his policy positions. What I mean when I say Miles is "not politicized" is that he does not allow his politics to interfere with his assessment of the facts. Rather than seeing the evidence through a politically colored lens, like so many economists, he follows a two-step process: first he gauges the evidence and draws conclusions in a dispassionate manner, and then he uses his moral compass to decide what ought to be done given those facts. Never does he allow himself to see the policy world as a battle between competing teams of "good guys" and "bad guys". Of course, that's the way a scientist is supposed to think. What makes Miles uncommon is that he believes, reflexively and implictly, that a macroeconomist is a scientist.

Miles also refuses to oversimplify his arguments for rhetorical purposes. Some economists believe that when there is a consensus among economists on some policy, it's legitimate to use too-simple-to-be-quite-right arguments when justifying that policy to the lay public - for example, that it's OK to tell a Ricardian comparative-advantage story when pushing for free trade in the popular press, even if the model that actually convinced economists to support free trade was something much more advanced like a Heckscher-Ohlin or Krugman model. Not so Miles Kimball. I have never heard him simplify an argument past the point where he believes it himself. This can make his writings a little harder to read, but you can be sure that nothing has been dumbed down for the benefit of the plebes.

Here are three posts to get you started in your travels through Miles-land:

1. Print Money and Buy Assets! This was Miles' most famous line when he taught my second-year macro field course. The normal term for this is "quantitative easing", which is what many people (including Milton Friedman) think the Fed should do when its normal monetary policy bumps up against the Zero Lower Nominal Interest Rate Bound (e.g. right now). In this epic post, Miles explains the rationale behind QE. If you are intrigued by the ideas of Scott Sumner and David Beckworth, you should read this post, which provides pretty much the best simple primer on QE that I've seen in the blogosphere.

2. How to make sure people spend their stimulus checks. Miles has an interesting idea about how to do fiscal stimulus. Instead of handing out cash or spending on infrastructure projects, he thinks we should have the government offer to lend money to people in the form of "Federal Lines of Credit". This, he says, will get us the biggest possible bang for our stimulus buck, since it guarantees that any money handed out by the government will actually be spent; if people don't take the loans the government offers them (which for them is equivalent as sticking a stimulus check in the bank), the government's deficit doesn't go up. I think this is a very interesting idea. I am not sure I completely buy it, since I think there's something to the idea of the "balance-sheet recession" (i.e. that it's a good idea to transfer household debts to the government, even if the money is not spent). But this probably just means that there's something I haven't thought of, and that Miles has thought of.

3. Taxes bad, redistribution good. Many people are familiar with the fact that people work about the same  amount whether taxes are low (as in the 2000s) or high (as in the 1960s). Miles agrees with this, but points out that high taxes hurt people in a different way, by making them feel so poor that they have to work more, and thus depriving them of leisure. For this reason, he thinks income taxes are bad, all other things being equal; he's a "supply-sider" in the sense of thinking that taxes matter. But he weighs this against his "liberalism", meaning that he supports some amount of income redistribution. Miles believes that policy should strike a balance between the economic distortions of taxes and the moral imperative of redistribution. Hence, he's a "supply-side liberal".

Anyway, if you have an interest in macro, bookmark Miles' blog. As for me, I had better get back to finishing up my dissertation, or the author of said blog will (quite justifiably) feed me to the sharks...
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