I looked up Lexapro withdrawal symptoms on Google and found out that is what is wrong with me. I am having all of the symptoms. This is terrible. I have to write some articles today and do some titling for Demand Studios. I have managed to get one article done. One! And it is already 3:30 in the afternoon. I haven't even tried to title because when I woke up I decided to do some writing first. A lot of good that has done me. I don't know what to do to ease these symptoms. I guess I have to go through them because I have to work. I cannot lay down on the couch and not work since we need the money. Argh! I guess I will just have to get through it somehow.
Lexapro Withdrawals
I looked up Lexapro withdrawal symptoms on Google and found out that is what is wrong with me. I am having all of the symptoms. This is terrible. I have to write some articles today and do some titling for Demand Studios. I have managed to get one article done. One! And it is already 3:30 in the afternoon. I haven't even tried to title because when I woke up I decided to do some writing first. A lot of good that has done me. I don't know what to do to ease these symptoms. I guess I have to go through them because I have to work. I cannot lay down on the couch and not work since we need the money. Argh! I guess I will just have to get through it somehow.
Globalization, unemployment, and inequality

Nancy Folbre makes the claim that globalization has worsened unemployment and inequality:
Why has the economic recovery left workers behind?...If few economists like this argument, it's not clear why. The opening of the Chinese and Indian markets meant that a huge mass of labor was dumped on the world market, without much capital to go along with it. Scarcity creates value; a relative abundance of labor and a relative scarcity of capital means that wages should fall while profits rise. This is exactly what has happened, so I'm not sure why people are surprised.
Many journalists argue that globalization is partly to blame for historically low rates of job creation over the last year. Companies in the United States are simply less reliant on American workers – and American consumers – than they once were. Maybe they just don’t need us any more...
Few economists like this argument...
This creates inequality, since rich people own more capital than poor people. If there are frictions in the labor market ("sticky nominal wages," for example, which means that it's hard to cut headline wages), this translates to unemployment. The "new global elite" that Chrystia Freeland and others write about are just people who are benefiting from the increased return to capital caused by globalization.
Of course, eventually the capital-labor imbalance should right itself, as China and India build up enough capital per worker that our workers become valuable again. This is, in fact, happening; Chinese and Indian wages are rising rapidly. Of course, China is slowing this process by pumping capital back into the U.S. by buying our Treasury bonds (which they do because that keeps their currency cheap and allows them to maintain steady export growth). But eventually, globalization will run its course and we'll see a resurgence in wages and a fall in profit margins.
Unfortunately, in the meantime, our nation's economy as a whole suffers, because it becomes harder to pay for public services like infrastructure and education. In an age when only a few citizens (capital owners) have money to spare, it's hard to get them to pay for stuff that benefits everyone, as Nancy Folbre points out:
During the 25 years after World War II, the interests of American investors and workers were closely, though not perfectly, aligned. Productivity increases were passed on in the form of higher wages that, in turn, fueled increasing demand for domestically produced goods and services.
Businesses willingly paid taxes to support public programs designed to improve the education, health and security of the labor force on which they relied.
The price of the disruption caused by globalization, she argues, is "increased social conflict, intensified economic inequality and weakened democracy." I find it hard to disagree. And unfortunately, I see little we can do about it, other than to try to rebalance global capital flows by pressuring China to revalue their currency. Even if we succeed at that, though, the basic dynamic will remain the same. Inequality is here to stay for quite some time.
Dregs of the Earth

Someday, the robots will replace mankind. But have they already started to replace the less talented among us? Tyler Cowen thinks so. He hypothesizes that one main reason for our high unemployment rate is that many low-skilled people now have "zero marginal product" as workers - that they have become as useless to our economy as squirrels or pigeons:
Keep in mind, we have had a recovery in output, but not in employment. That means a smaller number of laborers are working, but we are producing as much as before...If I ran a business, fired ten people, and output didn't go down, might I start by asking whether those people produced anything useful?...Before I say anything about this, I'll let two very experienced economists take the argument apart from a technical standpoint. First, Paul Krugman:
There is another striking fact about the recession, namely that unemployment is quite low for highly educated workers but about sixteen percent for the less educated workers with no high school degree...This is consistent with the zero marginal product hypothesis...
[I]f one factor of production has a zero marginal product, other factors must have very high marginal products, and hence be in great demand. So where are these factors? Is it capital? Then why so much overcapacity in almost every line of business? is it labor with particular skills, or in particular locations? As Mike Konczal points out, basically everyone’s unemployment rate has doubled, no matter their education level or location.Now, Arnold Kling:
Let us talk about the marginal product of worker i in occupation j. In most cases, this is indeed zero. My marginal product would be zero in fishing, medicine, and many other fields. In a complex economy, if you were to randomly assign workers to jobs, ZMP would be the norm, not the exception. The more complex the economy, the more carefully workers must be assigned in order to avoid ZMP...The upshot: many conditions in the economy can make it look as if workers are useless, when they really aren't. The mere fact that output has recovered while employment has lagged is not sufficient to conclude that some humans have become obsolete.
[Also,] when a manufacturer has excess inventory, production workers have effectively ZMP. But for the economy as a whole, that is consistent with an aggregate demand story [instead of Cowen's hypothesis]...
But I wonder whether Cowen is really interested in these alternate explanations. In his post, he himself comes up with an alternate story to explain his observations, and then summarily dismisses it. Read carefully:
Garett Jones suggests that many unemployed workers are potentially productive, but that businesses do not, at this moment, want to invest in future productive improvements. The workers only appear to have zero marginal product, because their marginal product lies in future returns not current returns. I see this hypothesis as part of the picture, although I am not sure it explains why current unemployment is so much higher among the unskilled. Is unskilled labor the fundamental capability-builder for the future? I'm not so sure.So, Cowen starts with the assumption that unskilled labor is not a "capacity-builder for the future", and thus he concludes that...unskilled labor has become useless. This sounds a lot like assuming the conclusion, doesn't it?
Actually, this "zero marginal product hypothesis" is simply a more extreme version of an argument many economists make. The theory of "skill-biased technological change," for instance, holds that inequality is due to new technologies that complement the abilities of high-skilled (read: smart) people, but make the skills of the low-skilled (read: dumb) people unnecessary. In the field of education economics, stagnant college attendance in the face of an increasing college wage premium is often taken as evidence that the people not going to college are simply too dumb to do so (rather than, say, that spaces in colleges are in essentially fixed supply).
These theories all fit into a single basic paradigm: poor and unemployed people are poor or unemployed because of a lack of natural talent, ability, or character. Losers lose because winners are better. Economists who believe this look at the lower classes and see not room for vast improvements, but just a bunch of people doing the best they can, which happens to be not much. This ability-based worldview is so deep-rooted that Tyler Cowen can employ the aforementioned circular logic without even thinking twice.
I just can't buy it. The economy is far too complex to be described as the sum of individuals' actions; we are not simply 6 billion one-person companies each producing widgets in our backyard smelters. If workers' wages always equaled the amount they produced, then thousands of investment bankers would be earning negative wages for the economic destruction wreaked by the promulgation of mortgage-backed CDOs; the fact that those bankers earned billions of dollars then and similar billions of dollars now suggests that something is very wrong. It also suggests that many of the people now languishing in unemployment represent wasted potential - that their unemployment is due to a failure of big complex institutions and mechanisms rather than to their IQs.
Update: Alex Tabarrok, Tyler Cowen's co-blogger, weighs in against Cowen's "Zero Marginal Product Hypothesis":
Tabarrok For The Win.The ZMP hypothesis is too close to a rejection of comparative advantage for my tastes. The term ZMP also suggests that the problem is the productivity of the unemployed when the actual problem is with the economy more generally (a version of the fundamental attribution error).
To see the latter point note that even within the categories of workers with the highest unemployment rates (say males without a high school degree) usually a large majority of these workers are employed. Within the same category are the unemployed so different from the employed? I don't think so.
From the Wikipedia article on the "fundamental attribution error":
In social psychology, the fundamental attribution error (also known as correspondence bias or attribution effect) describes the tendency to over-value dispositional or personality-based explanations for the observed behaviors of others while under-valuing situational explanations for those behaviors...Tabarrok is quite right. And I would go farther: the "fundamental attribution error" is at the core not just of Cowen's view of unemployment, but of the entire worldview of many "right-leaning" economists.
As a simple example, if Alice saw Bob trip over a rock and fall, Alice might consider Bob to be clumsy or careless (dispositional). If Alice later tripped over the same rock herself, she would be more likely to blame the placement of the rock (situational).
Getting ready for the next American century

Snarky, contrarian pundits have been doing their best of late to come up with reasons why China's rise (and America's accompanying decline) is not as soon as everyone seems to think, or is not inevitable, or is not such a bad thing in any case. Gideon Rachman does an excellent job of taking down these silly folks in a piece in Foreign Policy. Some excerpts:
Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf. But a frequently overlooked fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right. The wolf did arrive -- and China is the wolf...The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient...China, by contrast, has proved its economic prowess on the global stage...This is no Soviet-style economic basket case.
Japan, of course, also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse. But [t]he Japanese population is less than half that of the United States, which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's. That was never going to happen. By contrast, China's population is more than four times that of the United States. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash. At the current pace, China could be No. 1 well before then...
Successive U.S. presidents, from the first Bush to Obama, have explicitly welcomed China's rise...But whatever they say in formal speeches, America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts, and rightly so. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners, a win-win rather than a zero-sum. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged. Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum, Larry Summers, then Obama's chief economic advisor, remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. The U.S. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. Leading economists, such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. Fred Bergsten, have taken a similar line, arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. So much for the win-win world...
In fact, rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues, from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war, but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons, not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences.
So, even if they never become as rich per person as we are, China is about to displace the United States as the most powerful country on the planet. This is generally a bad thing for us, especially considering the predatory mercantilism and geopolitical aggressiveness that are accompanying China's rise.
So, the question now becomes: What do we do about this? On the economic front, I agree with Krugman and Bergsten that tariffs are an appropriate tool for discouraging Chinese mercantilism. Pushing them to revalue their currency may bring some of our jobs back, as well as reducing future financial bubbles, but it won't check China's rise or make them less aggressive. For that, we need to deal with the geopolitical threat with geopolitical means. That means forming alliances.
Alliances are the key to national power. Germany and Japan lost World War 2 because Britain and the U.S. managed to ally with the Soviet Union and China; the USSR was stymied in the Cold War in part by the U.S.' alliance with Japan and Germany, as well as (later) China. China is easily big enough to beat the U.S. in any conceivable kind of one-on-one confrontation; hence, we must follow the lessons of history and build a gang that is capable of overcoming China should they make aggressive moves.
Who will be in that gang? The key alliance must be with India, which is the only country with a population to match China's. Japan is another obvious one, given China's antipathy toward and proximity to that country. Smaller Asian countries threatened by China or its proxies - Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines - can be important members of the emerging coalition as well. Then there's Russia, which also has reason to fear China's proximity and might, but is always somewhat of a geopolitical wild card; instead of persuading Russia to join us in a China-containing coalition, our best hope is to persuade Russia to adopt a policy of cagey neutrality (thus making China nervous).
These alliances should be cemented by free-trade agreements. If given a choice between sourcing manufactured products from our chief rival vs. one of our allies, we should choose the ally; thus, we should use free trade agreements to bias our foreign investment toward India, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc. and away from China. In addition, creating multilateral free-trade areas between rich allies like Japan and Korea and poor allies like India and Vietnam will form the core of a Pacific alliance that is largely independent of the U.S. - something that we want to promote in any case.
In addition to alliances, the U.S. should be building up its own power. In the short term, that means rebuilding our infrastructure, reforming our educational system, fixing our dysfunctional Senate, controlling health care costs, and raising taxes. In the longer term, it means one and only one thing: immigration. The ability to add population by assimilation of foreigners, coupled with America's large endowments of land and resources, is America's ace in the hole. We can comfortably fit more people on our land than China can on its own; in the long run, this means that we will be more powerful than China or any other country. We should take advantage of our nation's riches and abundant space to bring over immigrants from every corner of the globe, boosting our population and keeping our fertility rates at the safe "replacement" level. What's more, we should focus on bringing over highly skilled and intelligent immigrants, assuring that the U.S. remains the world's research and development center even as manufacturing supply chains move to more densely-populated Asia.
In order to remain a superpower, therefore, the U.S. needs to be a multiracial nation with a multilateral foreign policy. The Tea Partiers' drive to exclude foreigners, and the neoconservatives' (now largely failed) attempt to have America go it alone, are anathema to our long-term national power. These self-defeating conservative impulses must be resisted.
In any case, the American Century is over, and the Chinese Half-Century has begun. Given the facts of population and resources, there is nothing we can do to stop China's rise, but there is plenty we can do to make sure that, if nations are still around by then, the 22nd Century belongs to America.
The center cannot hold

Economist blogger E.G. wonders why Democrats/liberals are more apologetic and defensive about their beliefs than conservatives:
In broad strokes, Republicans, especially of the tea-party stripe, are typically proud, at least unapologetic, and sometimes belligerent about their beliefs. Democrats, in contrast, seem to adopt the defensive position by default...To me, the phenomenon in question seems very real, and the explanation seems rather obvious. I'm not sure why E.G. didn't think of it.Why are Democrats more anemic? One thought comes from the liberal journalist Thomas Frank. Writing in Harper's, Mr Frank argues that while Republicans respond to their base, Democrats have a misbegotten faith in a "Magic Middle" of centrist ideas that are tolerable, at least, to most Americans:
A couple of other theories: Democrats are constrained by their insecurities, a holdover from being made fun of by George W Bush and Fox News. Democrats are undermined by deeper, historical anxieties; with the Republicans having co-opted the rhetoric of being the "real America", Democrats feel that they have to explain themselves before they can proceed. Or, there's something cultural going on: there are temperamental traits that draw a person to the Democratic or Republican parties, and those same traits, aggregated, are manifested by the parties themselves.Democrats, for their part, tend to do the opposite, dreaming of bipartisanship and states neither red nor blue and of some reasonably-arrived-at consensus future in which the culture wars cease and everyone plays nicely forevermore under the smiling, benificent sun of free trade and the knowledge industries.
Conservatives are less apologetic about their beliefs because conservative beliefs have a stronger base of support. Whereas 40% of Americans identify as conservatives, only 20% identify as liberals, with the rest identifying as moderates. These numbers have been very stable over the past two decades. That means that if you are a Republican, hoping to win in a Republican primary, you are appealing to a much more ideological median voter than your Democratic counterpart. And in the general election, trumpeting conservative beliefs will probably alienate fewer of those moderates than trumpeting liberal ones. Case closed.
The more interesting question, and the one E.G. should really be asking, is: why are more Americans conservative in the first place? Since people tend to define their ideology relative to the national average, you'd expect a symmetric distribution of ideology; instead, we have a rightward skewed distribution, with a "long tail" of right-wing conservatives and a short fat tail of liberal-leaning moderates.
My guess as to the reason for the skew is: tribalism. Politics is generally an exercise in coalition-building between tribal blocs who vote for their "team". The "team" can be determined in many ways - race, language, religion, region, or socioeconomic class - and people can identify more strongly or less strongly with any given team. Teams can also overlap. It is these divided loyalties, and the shifting and changing of the coalitions, that make politics so complex.
Who are the "teams" in America? Well, the Republicans are composed of the "white" team (not whites, but rather, people who think of whiteness as their key characteristic), the "Christian" team (again, not all Christians), the "Southern" team, and the "business class". The first three of these overlap a great deal, and those three are very strong affiliations with lots of members. Democrats, on the other hand, are a hodgepodge of disparate little groups and blocs - blacks, gays, union workers, Hispanics, intellectuals, Asians, Jews, schoolteachers, etc. While some of these factions are very strongly unified (blacks most of all), the interests of the various Democratic support groups diverge wildly.
Hence, while the Republican Party is basically a simple deal - deregulate the economy and lower taxes, in exchange for excluding and disenfranchising nonwhites and non-Christians - the Democratic Party has to strike a much more careful (and much more changeable) balance. This accounts for the "defensive" and apologetic tone that E.G. wondered about. The fact is, Democrats' hopes for victory rest on their ability to convince everyone-who's-not-a-Republican that together they form some sort of political "center", while Republicans' hopes for victory rest on their higher voter turnout and on the fragility of the Dems' coalition.
(Note that this entire dynamic can be understood by watching the movie "Revenge of the Nerds". The white jock fraternity loses out when they find they are outnumbered by the combined mass of nerds, blacks, gays, Asians, Jews, and traditionally excluded folks in general.)
The really interesting moment in American politics will come if and when the Republican base shrinks in relative size such that it is no longer big enough to win just by turning out in greater numbers. This will happen if/when immigration outpaces Republican efforts to convince Midwestern whites to act like Southern whites. On that day, the Republicans will have to either forge a new coalition - which will be hard, since they'll be so out of the habit - or try for a military coup. I wonder what they'll do.
Self-guarding guardians


Plato (inventor of the plate!) suggested that society's safety and virtue be preserved by a class of powerful "guardians," enlightened souls entrusted with a monopoly on violence. "But," someone asks, "Who will guard the guardians?" Plato's answer was that the guardians will guard themselves, being persons of superior moral fiber. This, incidentally, was Confucius' answer to the same question.
James Madison begged to differ. In The Federalist #51, he argued that self-interest was too powerful a force for virtue to overcome. This may be because power corrupts, or because power attracts the already-corrupt, or simply because the corrupt are more aggressive about pursuing their self-interest. Madison suggests a new solution: checks and balances. Through good institutional design, different self-interested individuals could be pitted against each other; these individuals, working within the system, would balance each other out to approximately represent the will of the nation at large. Thus, we have democratic elections; we have a division of powers between levels of government; we have the three branches of the federal government; etc.
Modern political theorists have offered many similar takes on the problem. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's models of political power struggles conclude that institutional design is very important; democracy and separation of powers increase the degree to which competing political factions are forced to provide for the public good in order to maintain power. Many others believe that it is no accident that the rich countries of the world are almost all democracies.
Some American libertarians, however, take issue with Madison's solution to the guardian-guarding problem. One of these skeptics is Will Wilkinson:
We are constantly exploited by the tools meant to foil our exploitation...So it's no surprise that progressives would rather worry over trivialities such as campaign finance reform than dwell on the paradoxes of political power. But it really isn't the Citizens United decision [that allows government officials to get cushy jobs in the finance industry]...Well-connected wonks can get rich on Wall Street only because Washington power is now so unconstrained...So, what is to be done? Summon a self-bottling genie-bottling genie?For Will, checks and balances are not enough. Institutional design cannot create a self-bottling genie-bottler (or a self-guarding guardian); the government must be shrunk as much as possible without destabilizing markets to the point of ruin.
The [libertarian] answer is to make government less powerful. The monstrous offspring of entangled markets and states can be defeated only by the most thorough possible separation.
I find this notion highly objectionable. In a way, it is a cop-out worthy of Plato and Confucius; libertarians throw up their hands and say "Just get rid of the damn guardians!" But this begs the question of who will toss out the guardians, and who will guard against the guardians' return. Presumably, the guardians will be ejected by a wave of individuals inculcated with strong personal libertarian values...and hey, we're back to calling for personal virtue.
So much for the American experiment.
James Madison, and most or all of our Founding Fathers - the libertarians of their day - would almost certainly disagree with the modern variety. They had just seen 3000 years of attempts to elevate virtuous individuals to positions of power. It was called the "dynastic cycle," and it was decidedly suboptimal. They knew that if they played the part of the Virtuous Men of their day, and overthrew government in the name of liberty, a new government would simply rise in the future and undo all their efforts. And so they saw only one way out of this trap: the design of self-sustaining political institutions that would maximize effective liberty. Only government can guard against government power, they realized; to let the perfect be the enemy of the good would simply mean the return of the despots.
So, tweaks like campaign finance reform might be small potatoes compared to the vast amount of corruption that still exists in the system, but they represent progress toward greater liberty, which libertarian admonishments to "just shrink the government" do not.
This is just one more instance of modern libertarianism's fatal flaw. When they come to a Gordian Knot of a problem (optimal public good provision, for example, or optimal institutional design), they reach for a sword. They want to hack through thorny engineering questions with the pure, clean, steel of unwavering ideology. That their solutions are unworkable is hardly a deterrent; ideological self-consistency takes precedence over real-world consequences. Hard problems, it seems, are just too hard.
Why we run deficits

Writing in Mother Jones, Kevin Drum notes that liberals have been far more willing to cut the deficit than conservatives over the past 30 years:
At the federal level, center-left types fought an entire national election in 2000 based largely on the idea that times were good and the federal government should be accumulating surpluses. It was a pretty big deal, and as you'll recall, we center-lefties lost that election and George Bush proceeded to piss away the surplus and run up more debt than any president in history. On the spending side, center lefties recently passed a big healthcare overhaul that was largely funded by cuts in Medicare spending, and instead of applause for their fiscal sobriety they got hammered for it by Republicans during the 2010 midterms. In other words, on the federal level center-left types have proven over and over that they are willing to be pretty responsible on spending and budgetary issues despite getting clobbered for it. But the opposite isn't true of conservatives and taxes. One need look no further than the national-level dogfight going on right now over the expiration of the deficit-busting tax cuts that originally got George Bush into the White House. No conservative who wants to win reelection even dares consider taking a responsible position on this.But how are things at the state level? What happens when center-lefties try to restrain spending and build up surpluses during good times? They very quickly learn a harsh lesson: if you accumulate money in a rainy-day fund, conservatives will promptly demand that it be "returned to the taxpayers." That happened here in California as far back as 1978 and was a big reason for the passage of Proposition 13. And if you allow a temporary tax cut to expire, your career might be over. This happened here in California as recently as 2003, when Gray Davis got tossed out on his ear for allowing the car license fee to automatically revert to its old level when the state budget got out of balance.
Nobody is an angel in this fight, and certainly liberals could do a better job of speaking out for spending restraint during boom times. But conservatives have made it largely pointless to build up federal surpluses or state rainy day funds even when lefties are feeling in a responsible mood. At the same time, conservatives have also made it career-threateningly dangerous to allow even temporary tax cuts to expire. It's true that there's always a steady hum of background pressure from interest groups to maintain spending levels, much of it from the left, but for the most part the really pointed incentives come from the conservative side and simply aren't symmetrical: they always run in favor of tax cuts and against spending restraint.
The whole idea of trying to balance budgets over the business cycle is practically a center-left platitude. The fact that it doesn't happen very often is attributable in small part to basic human nature (nobody likes to restrain spending when money is available) and in very large part to the fact that conservatives flatly won't let it happen.
This is very true. But Drum ignores the question of why. Do conservatives support big deficits because the conservative philosophy of government says deficits are good? Is it because naturally irresponsible human beings are drawn to the Republican party? Or is it because the outcome of some political bargaining game (the "two Santas" theory) forces Republicans to promise more goodies than Democrats?
I'm not sure, but here is an important point that many Americans fail to realize: All rich countries have run huge deficits in the past 30 years, from socialist France to conservative Japan. The U.S. is in no way unique. There appear to be no fiscal hawks in power anywhere in the developed world.
To me, this is a signal that the root cause of rich-world deficits goes far deeper than the vagaries of a single nation's politics or the ideology of any one faction. Something happened to the world that made it impossible for rich-world governments to balance their budgets. That something, I am guessing, is capital mobility.
In the branch of economics called "public choice theory," a well-known result is that there are only two ways to pay for public services (i.e. public goods whose costs depend on the number of people using the good): 1) make the rich people pay more than they'd offer to pay, or 2) run a big deficit. This is called the "Groves-Clarke" result. When a government pays for its services by holding a gun to rich people's heads, it's called an "AGV mechanism," and when it runs a deficit, it's called a "Groves-Clarke mechanism". See here for the math if you're interested.
Before 1980, we basically held a gun to our rich people's heads and said "Pay up." Top marginal tax rates were over 90%. Corporate taxes were high. This situation was essentially the same in Europe and Japan. But around 1980, something big changed: capital mobility. Global rules changed, and financial markets opened, allowing rich people to move their money wherever they saw fit. This basically gave rich folks an outside option; if taxes were too high, they could move their money elsewhere.
If the rich people have an outside option, AGV doesn't work - the only way to pay for government is to run deficits (Groves-Clarke). Thus, when world capital markets opened, deficits appeared in all rich countries and have persisted ever since. Naturally, this is a problem, since it logically ends in all rich countries defaulting on their debts, after which they will either drastically slash government services ("austerity") or close their capital markets and go back to forcing the rich people to fork over the loot.
This is a rather depressing explanation for why rich countries run big deficits, but I think it is the right one. Republicans have been more willing to run deficits, but that is probably just because they represent the rich people who will move their money out of the country if taxes are raised to balance the budget. We probably confront a devil's choice between closing our capital markets (and thus hurting international trade) or deeply cutting public services like roads and schools - things that are a net positive for the country, but that aren't worth the price to the rich.